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Abstract
This dissertation examines the information content and market microstructure 
effects o f analysts’ initial coverage. The first essay centers on the valuation effect of 
analysts’ initial coverages and discusses the roles of trading volume and firm size in the 
revaluation process. First, a large average abnormal return (7.46%) is observed on the 
day the initial coverages are released via the Dow Jones News Wire. The average 
abnormal return of initial coverages is significantly larger than the average abnormal 
returns o f analysts’ upgrade recommendations, implying marginal information content for 
firms with initial coverage is greater than firms which are already in the analysts’ 
recommendation lists. Second, small firms with initial coverage experience a larger 
abnormal return (11.13%) than large firms (4.13%). Third, the abnormal return is found 
to be positively related to normal trading volume. This is consistent with Bhushan (1989) 
that the price system of firms with higher expected trading volume contains more noise, 
but inconsistent with Barber and Loeffler (1993) that an order imbalance due to noise 
traders’ response causes a larger price reaction for firms with less volume and less 
liquidity.
In second essay, market microstructure effects of analysts’ initial coverages is 
examined. Since analysts’ recommendations are usually disseminated to clients first and 
then released to the public, this provides a unique setting to empirically examine the 
behavior of informed trading. In particular, three issues are investigated. First, how 
quickly do stock prices incorporate private information ? Using a sample of 87 initial
x
coverages, most of abnormal returns on the release day occur at the opening trade and 
at trades within ten minutes after the opening trade. Second, comparing the efficiency 
of the call market and dealership market in reflecting private information, private 
information can be more efficiently revealed in the call market (NYSE/AMEX) than in 
the dealership market (NASDAQ). Third, when trade size choice of informed traders 
is investigated, the proportion of trades in medium size, ranging from 500 to 9,900 
shares, increases significantly in the private information period. The results are 
consistent with Barclay and W arner’s (1993) stealth trading hypothesis in that traders 
prefer to use medium size trades when they have private information.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Financial analysts’ stock picking ability has long been a subject of controversy 
among practitioners and academics in the paradigm of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
However, extant studies (see, for example, Bjerring, Lakonishock and Vermalen (1983), 
Glascock, Henderson, and Martin (1986), Beneish (1991), and Barber and Loeffler 
(1993)) document that the market reacts positively (negatively) to analysts’ favorable 
(unfavorable) recommendations.
There are several reasons why analysts can provide valuable information to 
market participants. Analysts search for and assess information about firms’ prospects 
by contacting managements of firms repeatedly, not only formally but also privately. 
Sometimes, analysts are involved in investment banking decisions, such as initial public 
offerings (IPOs), seasonal offerings, and mergers and takeover events. Analysts can also 
obtain information from suppliers, regional distributors, and other sources. By 
accumulating information on a day-to-day basis, analysts can maintain an informational 
advantage over other market participants. Therefore, analysts’ recommendations can be 
informative and valuable.
This dissertation, which contains two essays, extends this line of research to 
investigate the information content and market microstructure effects of analysts’ initial 
coverages. In the first essay, the valuation effect of analysts’ initial coverages is 
examined and the roles of trading volume and firm size in the revaluation process are
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discussed. In the second essay, the market microstructure effect of the release of 
information contained in analysts’ initial coverages is examined.
The plan of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related literature. 
Chapter 3 explores information content of analysts’ recommendations. Empirical tests 




Previous studies obtain analysts’ recommendations from three sources: the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ), the Value Line recommendations, and brokerage houses’ 
recommendations (see, Table 1). Previous studies in each of the three sources are 
reviewed below.
2.1 The Wall Street Journal
Empirical studies on recommendations published in the WSJ (Davies and Canes 
(1978), Liu, Smith, and Syed (1990), Beneith and Maris (1992) and Barber and Loeffler 
(1993)) indicate that analysts’ recommendations are of value, even though they are 
believed to be disseminated subsequent to private releases. Davies and Canes (1978) 
show that there is abnormal stock price performance on the day o f publication of 
analysts’ recommendations in the "Heard on the Street" column of the WSJ for the years 
1970-1971. They conclude that analysts provide information to their clients and that the 
secondary dissemination of analysts’ recommendation has a significant effect on stock 
prices.
Huth and Maris (1992) also report a similar price reaction to analyst 
recommendations in the WSJ "Heard on the Street" column. They demonstrate that firm 
size is an important variable for negative comments in the column, but not for the 
favorable comments. Huth and Maris (1992) attribute no size-effect associated with 
favorable recommendations to their small sample size.
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Recently, Barber and Loeffler (1993) find an average abnormal return of 3.53% 
on the announcement of analysts’ recommendations published in the monthly "Dartboard" 
column of the Wall Street Journal. They claim that the magnitude of the abnormal return 
in their study to be the largest among published studies on analysts’ recommendations.
2.2 Brokerage H ouses’ Recom mendations
As for the recommendations disseminated by research analysts of brokerage 
houses, Glascock, Henderson, and Martin (1986) examine a sample of E .F. Hutton’s 
aggressive purchase recommendations. They find that over the 10 trading days following 
the announcement, 13 of the 16 recommendations generate a risk adjusted excess return 
of 4.5 percent and, over the 80 trading days after that, there is a 7.6 percent excess 
return. Thus, they suggest that analysts can forecast better than the overall markets.
Meanwhile, Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Martin (1986) evaluate the 
recommendations of a regional Canadian money management and investment service 
company, which since 1977 has published a weekly "recommended" and a "speculative" 
list of stocks, and a monthly "representative" list. For stocks recommended by the 
company, abnormal returns are observed, which are statistically and economically 
significant. Thus, they conclude that analysts’ recommendations are valuable to 
investors.
Recently, Womack (1993) examined a long term price drift after brokerage 
houses’ analysts’ recommendations. He reports that initial price reactions are 
incomplete, and that there is a post-recommendation risk-adjusted price drift, implying 
analysts’ recommendations provide tradable value for investors. His results are
inconsistent with those reported by Barber and Loeffler (1993) who show a price reversal 
after an initial positive price reaction to analysts’ favorable recommendations.
2.3 The Value Line
The Value Line Inc. is the world’s largest investment advisory publisher. The 
firm provides a range of investment information on approximately 1700 stocks. 
Copeland and Mayers (1982) evaluate the performance of the Value Line Investment 
Survey recommendations made between 1965 and 1978. They find an annual abnormal 
rate of return of about 6.8% for an investor who was long in portfolio 1 and short in 
portfolio 5. They also report a lag of up to two weeks in the market’s adjustment to 
most Value Line recommendations. Excess returns are also found to spread over 13 
weeks for changes to rank 5. Both of these lagged adjustments have modest statistical 
significance.
Stickel (1985) finds abnormal event period returns of +2.4%  for firms added to 
Value Line rank 1 (the highest) and -0.3% for firms added to rank 5 (the lowest). He 
concludes that recommendations on the Value Line are of value.
Overall, abnormal returns on the announcement of recommendations from the 
WSJ, the Value Line, or brokerage houses indicate that analysts’ recommendations carry 
valuable information to market participants.
2.4 Mechanism of Disseminating Analysts’ Recommendations
Since this study focuses on analysts’ recommendations released via the Dow Jones 
News Wire (DJNW), it would be helpful to review the mechanisms of brokerage houses 
disseminating analysts’ recommendations to the DJNW. Marton (1987) outlines the
mechanisms as follows. First, analysts collect and assess various sources of information. 
When an analyst significantly changes an earnings forecast and recommend a buy or a 
sell on a stock, most brokerage houses first apply their internal compliance mechanisms. 
As a first check, the report must be submitted in writing to the head of the research 
department. If the change in opinion is rooted in something that might be construed as 
inside information, a discussion between the analyst and the head of research is usually 
mandatory to avoid any violation of rules and regulations.
Another issue that need to be considered is "front-running", which is a practice 
in that a research analyst shares or trades on material information before the firm’s 
clients have access to the analyst’s research. If a brokerage house does not prevent such 
"front-running", it violates the NYSE’s rule 342 (b), which requires brokerage firms to 
provide appropriate supervisory control associated with analysts’ research reports.
After approved by the head of research, recommendations are disseminated 
through the electronic communications network to ensure its simultaneous 
communication. It is usually during daily morning calls to both traders and institutional 
sales persons that research analysts spread their recommendations. For example, Marton 
(1987, p. 147) states that "At E .F. Hutton & Co., after a new piece of research 
information is unearthed, it is communicated first and simultaneously to institutional 
salesmen and block traders before a special "profit line" is hooked up to Hutton’s 400 
retail offices across the country."
Once their clients’ are informed and have traded on the information, analysts’ 
recommendations may be released to the Dow Jones News Wire (Broad Tape). This is
done through one of two methods. First, analysts report to the Dow Jones News about 
their change of recommendations after disseminating their opinions to their clients first. 
In this case, staffs in the Dow Jones News release the news through the Wire, which can 
be accessed throughout the country by the subscribers. Second, recommendations are 
reported to the Dow Jones News Wire by the staffs in the Dow Jones News Services 
who, observing rumors in the Street, contact the brokerage house to verify the truth of 
recommendations. Then, after a series of screening processes, analysts’ 
recommendations are reported through the Broad Tape.
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Table 1
Previous studies on analysts’ recommendations released from the WSJ, brokerage houses, 
and the Value Line.
I. Recommendations in the Wall Street Journal
* Colker (1963)
* Logue and Tuttle (1973)
* Davies and Canes (1978)
* Liu, Smith, and Syed (1990)
* Beneish (1991)
* Huth and Maris (1992)
* Barber and Loeffler (1993)
II. Recommendations by Brokerage Houses
* Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease (1979)
* Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983)
* Glascock, Henderson, and Martin (1986)
* Womack (1993)
III. Recommendations on the Value Line
* Black (1973)
* Copeland and Mayers (1982)
* Shekel (1985)
C hapter 3
Inform ation Content of Analysts’ In itial Coverages:
F irm  Size and Trading Volume Effects
3.1 In troduction
Security analysts collect and disseminate information about firms they cover. The 
extant studies find that analysts have superior earnings forecasting ability over simple 
time-series models.1 Also, the market tends to react positively (negatively) to analysts’ 
buy (sell) recommendations.2 The evidence suggests that security analysts, collectively, 
produce valuable information to market participants.
This essay extends this line of research to study the information content of 
analysts’ initial coverages. This has not been previously explored in the literature. The 
purpose of this study is two-fold. First, I characterize the firms on which analysts 
initiate a coverage. Since initial coverages usually carry a buy recommendation, this 
could indicate that the firms were neglected by analysts and are currently undervalued. 
Hence, it is expected that the initially covered firms will be smaller and less followed by 
analysts than the firms currently in the brokerage houses’ recommendation lists. 
Furthermore, the initial buy recommendations should induce substantial trading activity 
and generate revaluation for the firms’ stocks.
1 Collins and Hopewood (1980), Givoly and Lakonishok (1984), M oyer, Chatfield,and Kelly (1985), 
and Armstrong (1983), among others.
2 Glascock, Henderson, and M artin (1986), Davies and Canes (1978), Beneish (1991), Huth and Maris 
(1992), and Barber and Loeffler (1993).
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In fact, a surprisingly large positive abnormal stock return of 7.46% occurs, on 
average, around the release of the analysts’ initial coverages via the Dow Jones News 
Wire (DJNW). The magnitude of this abnormal return is about double the level of 
abnormal returns documented in previous studies. The largest average abnormal return 
documented in previous studies on analysts’ recommendations is 3.53% by Barber and 
Loeffler (1993), who examine buy recommendations in the WSJ "Dartboard" column. 
Therefore, compared to other types of analysts’ recommendations, the initial buy 
recommendations appear to have greater information content.
The second purpose is to examine the major determinants of the revaluation 
induced by initial buy recommendations. In particular, this dissertation explores, cross- 
sectionally, the role of firm size and trading volume in the revaluation.
Firm size is an important variable that needs to be considered in the revaluation 
process. Analysts’ recommendations have an important certification effect, especially 
for small firms. Small firms usually do not attract financial analysts’ attention. 
However, when an analyst initiates coverage on a small firm and recommends that 
investors buy the firm’s stock, the recommendation may certify that the firm is a "good" 
firm to invest in. It is conceivable that small firms would benefit more from analysts’ 
certification effect than large firms.
Furthermore, there is an asymmetry in press coverage; less news is reported about 
small firms than large firms. Large firms may also have a public relations department, 
which tends to voluntarily disclose the firms’ prospects to the public. Hence, compared 
with large firms, small firms tend to have less information available. As a result, the
11
marginal information content of analysts’ recommendations on small firms would be 
greater than on large firms.
Although the argument for the small firm effect is quite convincing, empirical 
evidence from studies on analysts’ recommendations is mixed. Stickel (1985) shows that 
small firms exhibit larger price reactions on the announcement of Value Line ranking 
changes. However, Barber and Loeffler (1993) find that, after controlling for the effects 
of trading volume and return volatility, firm size is no longer an important variable in 
explaining variation in price reactions to the release of analysts’ recommendations. This 
correct study may provide additional evidence to resolve this unsettled size issue.
Currently, there also are conflicting results regarding how the stock price reaction 
to an information release is related to trading volume. Intuitively, firms that are actively 
traded and have high trading volume are less likely to be mispriced. Since trading 
carries information, the information is likely to be quickly impounded into stock prices. 
Therefore, one would expect that actively traded stocks should have a smaller valuation 
effect on the release of analysts’ recommendations.
Furthermore, liquidity is positively related to trading volume; i.e ., actively traded 
stocks tend to be more liquid than thinly traded stocks. As Barber and Loeffler (1993) 
argue, if the release of analysts’ recommendations creates buying pressure by naive 
investors, the order imbalance would cause greater price responses for stocks with less 
liquidity. Thus, this liquidity argument implies that the stock price reaction to the release 
of analysts’ recommendations should be inversely related to normal trading volume 
measured before the recommendation. On the other hand, Bhushan (1989) models the
12
supply noise as the variability of liquidity-motivated trading in the shares of the firm. 
In his model, noise in stock prices increases with expected trading volume. An increase 
in noise benefits the collection of private information by analysts. Therefore, holding 
other things constant, Bhushan predicts that firms with higher expected trading volume 
have more information collected about them and have higher marginal information 
content of announcements. His model implies that firms with high normal trading 
volume should experience a larger revaluation at the release of analysts’ 
recommendations. This prediction contradicts the above prediction that price reaction 
is negatively related to trading volume. The conflicting predictions motivate further 
empirical examination of the role of trading volume in the revaluation process.
This essay is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample selections and 
data. Section 3 discusses the methodology. Section 4 shows the empirical results. 
Sections 5 contains the summary and conclusions.
3.2 Description of Sample and data
3.2.1 Sample Selection
This study analyzes a sample of 94 initial coverages, and compares them with 380 
upgrade recommendations and 141 downgrade recommendations. To obtain these 
samples, news of analysts’ recommendations from the TEXT of the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval were searched using the key words "analyst$ and initial$ and cov$" for the 
initial coverage sample and "analysts and recommend$" for the upgrade and downgrade 
recommendation samples.3 This resulted in 687 documents in total, which were
3 $ sign is used as a wild card in searching documents from TEXT or TEXTM of the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval.
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released through the Dow Jones News Wire in 1991. Among these documents, as shown 
in Table 4, 48 were excluded from the sample because of no time-stamp (6), no date (1), 
duplicates (2), or no relation to financial analysts’ stock buy or sell recommendations 
(39).4 Each document contains date and time of recommendation released to the Broad 
Tape, company symbol, name of the analyst and the brokerage house the analyst is 
affiliated with, and type of recommendation. A sample of the document is presented in 
Appendix C.
The 646 recommendations in the sample were disseminated by 84 brokerage 
houses. In terms of the number of recommendations, the top three in the list are Smith 
Barney, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs, which issued 54, 49, and 42 
recommendations, respectively. As shown in Appendix A, the top 20 brokerage firms 
account for 74.83 percent of the recommendations in the sample.
Among the 646 recommendations, 346 cases involve 255 firms listed on the 
NYSE and AMEX, and the remaining 269 cases involve 172 firms traded on the 
NASDAQ/OTC market. The three most frequently recommended stocks in the sample 
are Microsoft, Centocor, and Apple Computer with 11, 11, and 9 recommendations, 
respectively. All three stocks are traded in the NASDAQ/OTC market. The most 
frequently recommended stock for exchange-listed stocks in the sample is U.S. Surgical 
with 8 recommendations.
In the sample, favorable recommendations (474), including initial coverage and 
upgrade recommendations, are much more than downgrade recommendations (141). This
4 F or example, recommendations made by political analysts or science analysts were excluded from 
the sample.
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is similar to the estimates of Zack’s Investment Research in Chicago. It reports that
Wall Street analysts recommend about five stocks to buy for every one to sell (Mendes 
(1992)).
Also, an article on the "Heard on the Street" column of WSJ, Jan 8, 1991 
highlights the facts of asymmetry between analysts’ buy and sell recommendations:
"Plenty of people on Wall Street have salty tongues. But
not many will use a certain four letter word: Sell A sell signal
usually comes, way late. It’s usually after the stock has already 
tanked. Most of the sell recommendations are after the fact. They 
are kicking (stocks) when they’re down. There are plenty of 
reasons brokerage houses rarely make sell recommendations.
Unlike buy ratings, sell ratings aren’t a big commission 
generator; many investors just ignore them. But they do generate 
plenty of ill will. Saying "sell" can lose a Wall Street house 
lucrative corporate-finance business, such as issuing a company’s 
stock or bonds, or advising a company on mergers. Finally, Wall 
Street analysts need to talk with corporate managements. And it 
isn’t unusual for a company to stop talking to an analyst who has 
uttered the "s" word.
As a result, some money managers view Wall Street 
recommendations as an elaborate code. According to several 
managers (and a few analysts), the translation goes something like 
this:
-A "strong buy" really is a buy.
-A "weak buy" or "buy/hold" means, "we like the 
company, but the stock is a little too high."
-A "hold", or "neutral" rating is a euphemism for sell.
-An outright "sell" recommendation means the company is 
a possible candidate for a trip to bankruptcy court.
Professional money managers react to this state of affairs 
by learning to read subtle clues. They watch for "a change of 
inflection in an analyst’s voice, or a less enthusiastic hold, or a 
downgrade" from buy to hold."
In short, this article suggests: first, analysts are reluctant to issue unfavorable
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recommendations for a firm in fear of alienating current clients or losing future business 
with them. Second, buy or favorable recommendations tend to generate more 
commissions (for brokerage houses) than sell or unfavorable recommendations. Third, 
if news turns out to be false, firms may take legal actions against analysts or brokerage 
houses for issuing sell recommendations that depress their stock prices.
The sample includes analysts’ initial coverages, along with upgrade (favorable) 
and downgrade (unfavorable) recommendations. Typical examples of headlines for each 
group of recommendations are given in Table 2.
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Table 2
Examples o f analysts’ recommendations regarding initial coverages, upgrade, and 
downgrade recommendations.
A. Initial Coverage with "BUY" recommendations
"Morgan initiates coverage of A&W Brands with BUY recommend", 12:40 PM, 
06/14/91, DOW JONES NEWS WIRE.
"Smith Barney issues initial BUY rate on Centex", 12:17 PM, 05/28/91, DOW 
JONES NEWS WIRE.
"First Boston issues initial BUY rate on Destec", 11:23 AM, 04/09/91, DOW 
JONES NEWS WIRE.
B. Upgrade recommendations
"Shearson upgrades JP Morgan, Bankers Trust NY to BUY", 10:34 AM, 
05/28/91, DOW JONES NEWS WIRE.
"Kidder ups rating on National Presto Ind. to BUY from HOLD", 2:55 PM, 
04/29/91, DOW JONES NEWS WIRE.
"Merrill, Goldman make positive comments on Apple Computer", 10:16 AM, 
2/1/91, DOW JONES NEWS WIRE.
C. Downgrade recommendations (NYSE/AMEX: 86, NASDAQ/NMS: 57).
"Robertson Stephens lowers rate on Health Images to HOLD", 12:53 PM, 
06/06/91, DOW JONES NEWS WIRE.
"Smith Barney removes Amdahl from BUY list", 1:02 PM, 04/02/91, DOW 
JONES NEWS WIRE.
"OpCo removes two fertilizer companies from recommended list", 11:11 AM, 
04/01/91, DOW JONES NEWS WIRE.
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Table 3
Name of brokerage house which issued stocks recommendations via The Dow Jones 
News Wire in 1991, and the frequency of the recommendations











DONALDSON LUFKIN JENRETTE 24
HAMBRECHT & QUIST 23
BEAR STERNS 20
COWEN AND CO 19










VECTOR SEC INTERNATIONAL 7
SOUND VIEW 6
WEINSTEIN 6
C J LAWRENCE 5
Other brokerage housesa 89
Total 645
a There are 56 brokerage firms which issued less than 5 recommendations.
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Table 4
Description of sample selection for analysts’ recommendations which were released via 
the Dow Jones News W ire in 1991.
Total Documents" for the year 1991
Not Related: 3 9 b 
No Date: 1 
Duplicate: 2 





Less 31 cases with insufficient 
observations in estimation period -31
Recommendations in the final sample 615
NYSE and AMEX: 346
NASDAQ/NMS: 269
Number of Firms in the Sample: 509
Number of Brokerage Houses: 72
Number of Initial Coveraged 94
Number of Upgrade Recommendations 381
Number of Downgrade Recommendations 141
a The sample data are collected from the TEXT of the Dow Jones News Services with 
codes of (ANALYSTS AND RECOMMENDS) or (ANALYSTS AND INITIALS 
AND COV$) , where $ sign is used as a wild card in selecting data. 
b For example, political, medical or science analysts’ recommendations. 
c When recommendations are made more than once for a firm in a trading day, earlier 
announcements are used. In addition, we exclude the recommendations which are 
conflicting among analysts and which are not in the CRSP files. 
d All of the initial coverage in the sample are "buy" or favorable recommendations.
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3.2.2 Data
To test price and volume reactions, daily stock returns and volume data are 
obtained for the sample firms on the Center of Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
files. The number of analysts following a firm is obtained from the Institutional Investors 
Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) by Lynch, Ryan, and Jones, Inc. The number of 
institutional holders, percentage of institutional holding, number of insiders, and 
percentage of insiders’ holding are obtained from the Disclosure. The reputation of 
brokerage houses is proxied by ranking of equity issue underwriters in 1991. The 
ranking of equity underwriters, announced in the Institutional Investor in February 1992, 
is made by giving full credit to the lead manager that is the investment bank with primary 
responsibility for the issue as shown in Table 5. Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs are 
number one and two in the ranking of equity underwriters in 1990 and 1991.
Table 5













1 1 Merrill Lynch $13,223 108
2 2 Goldman Sachs 12,110 71
8 3 Morgan Stanley 10,422 59
3 4 Alex. Brown & sons 7,305 63
4 5 Lehman Brothers 5,242 74
9 6 First Boston 4,687 48
5 7 Salomon Brothers 4,207 39
6 8 Smith Barney 2,027 45
7 9 Painwebber 1,618 41
12 10 Prudential Securities 1,549 16
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3.2.3 Sample Characteristics
Panel A of Table 6 presents the frequency distribution of analysts’ 
recommendations by time of the day and panel B presents the distribution by day of the 
week. Out of 646 announcements, only two are made before 9:30, while 52 are released 
after 4:30. 92 percent of recommendations are released during trading hours with the 
majority o f recommendations occurring between 10:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. As for 
interday patterns, there is no particular concentration on any day of the week.
Table 7 presents summary statistics of average price, average daily trading 
volume, average market value of equity, and market capitalization in decile relative to 
all firms in the CRSP files for the sample firms in each subgroup. The capitalization and 
stock price for firms with upgrade recommendations are similar to those with downgrade 
recommendations. The median daily trading volume of firms with initial coverage is 
equal to 61,201 shares, which is smaller than those of firms with upgrade 
recommendations (213,577 shares) or downgrade recommendations (262,378 shares). 
Also, median capitalization of firms with initial coverage is $286 million, which is one 
sixth o f the median capitalization of firms with unfavorable recommendations. This 
indicates that, on average, firms in the initial coverage sample are smaller than firms 
with upgrade or downgrade recommendations. However, the medians, of the market 
value decile relative to all firms in the CRSP tapes for all three groups are no smaller 
than eight, implying that overall sample firms are relatively large in the markets.
The average number o f analysts following a firm with favorable and unfavorable 
recommendations are 17.20 and 19.64, respectively. Whereas, for the initially covered
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firm, the average number of analysts following is 8.69, which is less than half of the 
above numbers. This difference may be attributed to the size difference. This is 
consistent with Bhushan (1989) who shows that there is a positive relationship between 
firm size and number of analysts following. The average number of institutional 
investors for initially covered firms is 84.48 and the average percentage of institutional 
holdings for these firms is about 37 percent. Firms in the upgrade and downgrade 
samples have a higher percentage of institutional holding, about 50 percent on average. 
Insiders’ holdings account for 19.49% of shares of initially covered firms, which is 
higher than 14.09% and 9.97% for firms with upgrade and downgrade recommendations, 
respectively.
Appendix B shows the distribution of sample firms by industry. In the upgrade 
and downgrade recommendation categories, firms in the computer industry are the most 
frequently recommended. Firms in the food processors industry are the most frequently 
recommended in the initial coverage category. In all three categories, firms in the drugs 
and biotechnology industries are also frequently recommended by analysts. That the 
distribution of recommended firms concentrates in biotechnology, computers, and drugs 
industries suggests that analysts tend to make recommendations for the firms, whose 
intrinsic values are difficult to estimate. Therefore, the service of analysts to market 
participants becomes more valuable in these industries.
Table 6
Distributions of the analysts’ recommendations by time of the day and by day of the 
week.











1 0 1 2
9:30-10:29 26 14 23 63
10:30-11:29 58 17 32 107
11:30-12:29 61 18 18 97
12:30- 1:29 84 23 24 131
1:30- 2:29 37 10 11 58
2:30- 3:29 47 6 9 62
3:30- 4:29 26 4 13 43
After 4:30 40 2 10 52
Total 380 94~ 141 615.









Mon 74 10 26 110
Tue 72 21 43 136
Wed 85 19 30 134
Thu 79 24 22 125
Fri 70 20 20 110
Total 380 94~ Til 615
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Table 7
Mean, median, and range of average price, daily trading volume, market capitalization, 
CRSP market capitalization decile, and number of analysts following of sample firms 
(N=645)























Number o fg 
insiders
12.11 10 1-55































































Number o fE 
insiders
22.41 19 5-62




8 Stock price of each sample firm is calculated with the average of the stock price in the
estimation period, from t=-225 to t= -26. 
b Trading volume for each sample firm is the mean of daily trading volume in the 
estimation period, from t=-225 to t= -26. 
c Capitalization for each firm is the year-end capitalization, obtained from the CRSP 
tapes.
d Number of analysts following is the number of estimates for one year earnings 
forecasts, obtained from I/B/E/S file. 
c'h These are obtained from the Disclosure.
Table 8
Number of recomme: 'ations and percentage of recommendations in the industries.



























































RETAILING - GOODS 16 4.11
BANKING 13 3.34
CHEMICALS 11 2.83




UNDESIGNATED TECH 8 2.06
FOOD PROCESSORS 7 1.80
AIRLINES 5 1.29
INVESTMENTS 5 1.29




ELECTRICAL UTILITIES 4 1.03
HOME PRODUCTS 4 1.03
PAPER 4 1.03
TELEPHONE UTILITIES 4 1.03
AEROSPACE 3 0.77
LEISURE 3 0.77
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Review of the literature is presented for the researchers’ name, estimation period, 





amount (SI) Type of Recommendations
Kim (1994) 1991 7.46
(11.56)
Initial coverage release via 
the Dow Jones News Wire
Womack (1993) 1989-1991 2.91
(14.06)
"Added to the buy list" of 






Buy recommendations on 






Buy recommendations on 






E.F. Hutton’s aggressive 
purchase recommendations
Stickel (1985) 1976-1980 0.86
(10.92)
Value Line rank changes 













1964-1970 1.56 Brokerage house 
recommendations 
(monthly data)
Abn. ret. amount, in most studies, refer to market adjusted abnormal returns, 




3.3.1 Measuring Abnormal Returns
To investigate the abnormal response associated with analysts’ recommendations, 
the market model is used. This model assumes that realized returns are represented by 
the following:
where
Rit =  return on common stock i on day t;
RnU =  return on the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio on day t;
£jt =  error term for firm i on day t; 
a;, j8j =  regression coefficients.
The error term, £it can be considered a measure of the abnormal return of 
security i on day t, since it represents the deviation of security / ’s return from its 
expected return, conditional upon the realized return on the market portfolio. The 
estimated expected return for security i at time t given the realized market return is given 
by the following equation:
<* i  +  P i-^7nt +  E i £ / ( 1 )
( 2 )
For each sample observation, calendar time is converted to event time by defining
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the date of dissemination of analysts’ recommendations through the Dow Jones News 
Wire as day 0. These regression coefficients are estimated over 200 days in the 
estimation period from days -225 to -26. For firm i on day t, abnormal return, Ait, is 
given by the following equation:
< 3 >
The average abnormal return for the portfolio of N firms is given by:
The ARt are summed over event time to obtain a cumulative average abnormal 
returns:
+25
CAR, = £  A R t ( 5 )
C = - 2 5
To provide a test of the statistical significance of the average abnormal returns, 
I employ Corrado’s (1989,1992) nonparametric rank test.5 In order to implement
5. Corrado (1989) shows that the nonparametric rank test for abnormal security-price performance is 
preferable to the parametric t-test for a broad spectrum of fat-tailed security-retum s distributions. 
Compared with its parametric tests and with standard nonparametric tests, his rank test offers improved 
specification under the null hypothesis and more power under the alternative hypothesis o f abnormal 
security-price performance. As emphasized by Brown and W arner (1980, 1985), a problem  with previous 
nonparametric tests, the signed rank and sign test, is the requirement that the excess-retum distributions 
be symmetrical for correct test specification. The Corrado rank test is less affected by an event-date excess- 
retum s variance increase than are the parametric tests.
Corrado’s nonparametric rank test, I transform each security’s time series of market 
model abnormal returns into their respective ranks.
Let Ku denote the rank of the abnormal return Ait in security i ’s time series of 261 
abnormal returns.
Ki t = R a n k ( A i t ) , t = - 2 2 5 , . . . »  + 2 5  ( 6 )
Where Ait >  Ay implies Kjt >  K;j and 261 >  Kit >  1.
Ranks are standardized by dividing by one plus the number of nonmissing returns in each 
firm ’s abnormal returns time series,
Ui t =Kic/ { 1 + M J  ( 7)
where Mt is the number of nonmissing returns for security i. This yields an order 
statistic for the uniform distribution with an expected value of one-half. The rank test 
statistic substitutes (Uit - 1/2) for the abnormal return Ait, yielding the day 0 test statistic,
T = ^ z Y j  (Ui0- l / 2 )  / S ( U )  ( 8 )
t/ N  i=i
The standard deviation S(U) is calculated using the entire sample period.
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where N, represents the number of nonmissing returns in the cross-section of N-firms 
on day t in event time.
3.3.2 Measuring Trading Volume Effects
In order to measure the effect of analysts’ recommendations on trading volume, 
the average daily trading volume in the estimation period is used as the benchmark:
_ ,  c- - 11
V, = -i- y  Vic  ( 1 0 )
1 2 4 0  _ ^ 0 2C
The rate of abnormal trading volume for each stock in the event period is calculated as,
ABNVOLi c ={Vi t - V i ) / V ± (11 )
where ABNVOLi( refers to the rate of abnormal trading volume for stock i at time t.
The average abnormal trading volume rate for each of the 20 days surrounding 
the event day is then estimated as,
1 N
A Vr = —  y  ABNVOL , ( 1 2 )  
xt
To provide a test of the statistical significance to the sample firms for each of the 




3.4.1 Valuation Effects of Initial Coverages
Table 10 summarizes the abnormal returns with Corrado’s nonparametric rank test 
and Boehmer’s parametric test, percentage of positive abnormal returns, and cumulative 
abnormal returns during the 51 day window surrounding the releases of initial coverages 
in 1991. The average abnormal return on the release day of initial coverages is 7.46% 
with Corrado’s rank test statistic of 11.61, which is significant at the 1% level. About 
90 percent of the sample firms with an initial coverage have a positive price reactions on 
the release day. The market also reacts positively on day -1, one day before the DJNW 
release day. The abnormal return on day -1 is 1.23%, which is significant at the 1% 
level. The two-day, day -1 and 0, abnormal return is 8.69%, suggesting that substantial 
revaluation is associated with the release of analysts’ initial coverages.
The magnitude of revaluation is much larger than abnormal returns documented 
in previous studies on analysts’ recommendations. Table 7 summarizes abnormal returns 
found in previous studies using late 80’s data and those using 60’s and 70’s data. The 
largest abnormal return documented in the previous studies is 3.53%, which is found by 
Barber and Loeffler (1993). They examine a sample of buy recommendations in the 
"Dartboard" of the WSJ. However, the abnormal return found in this study for analysts’ 
initial coverage is about twice as large as that reported by Barber and Loeffler (1993). 
Thus, the results imply that analysts’ initial coverages have greater marginal information 
content than buy recommendations in the WSJ "Dartboard" column.
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In Table 10, except for day t= - l ,  there is no price run-up for the 9 days prior 
to the release, indicating no severe "front-running" associated with analysts’ 
recommendations. This is consistent with the expectation that, as communication 
technology advances, and timing has become more important for investors, analysts’ 
recommendations are disseminated to the clients simultaneously and investors react to the 
information in a fast manner. Furthermore, there is no indication o f information leakage 
before the release day. The result is also in contrast with earlier studies using 1960’s 
and 1970’s data, which showed price run-ups several days before the public releases of 
analysts’ recommendations.
3.4.2 Upgrade and Downgrade Recommendations
Table 11 reports valuation effects of analysts’ upgrade recommendations released 
via the DJNW in 1991. The abnormal return on day 0 is 4.43%, significant at the 1% 
level. The abnormal return is 0.77% on day -1, significant at the 1 % level. The two-day 
abnormal return of 5.20% is comparable to the abnormal return of 3.53% reported by 
Barber and Loeffler (1993) for WSJ "Dartboard" buy recommendations. Nonetheless, 
the valuation effects of analysts’ initial coverage appears to be larger than that of 
analysts’ upgrade recommendations. This is consistent with the argument that the 
marginal benefit is larger for firms covered by analysts for the first time than for firms 
which are already in the analysts’ recommendation lists.
Table 12 summarizes abnormal returns associated with analysts’ downgrade 
recommendations. The abnormal return on day 0 is -4.39% and is -2.1 % on day -1, both 
significant at the 1 % level. The results in Tables 11 and 12 indicate that while analysts’
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upgrade recommendations tend to generate a positive revaluation, downgrade 
recommendations tend to generate a negative revaluation. These results are consistent 
with those reported by Davis and Canes (1978) and Liu, Smith, and Syed (1990), who 
examine both buy and sell recommendations in the WSJ "Heard on the Street" column.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the cumulative returns for the initial coverages, upgrade 
and downgrade recommendations, respectively, in the 51-day window surrounding the 
release day of analysts’ recommendations. Consistent with Barber and Loeffler (1993), 
there is a price reversal for the sample of analysts’ upgrade recommendations. However, 
no apparent price reversal for the sample of analysts’ initial coverages is found, implying 
that there is more information content associated with analysts’ initial coverages than with 
upgrade recommendations. Similarly, Figure 3 shows that more price decreases occur 
over 25 days after the release of the downgrade recommendations.
3.4,3 Trading Volume
Table 13 reports the abnormal trading volume for firms with initial coverage, 
upgrade recommendations, and downgrade recommendations. For all the three categories 
of recommendations, abnormal volume peaks on the release day and gradually decays for 
the 10 days subsequent to the release day. For the sample of initial coverages, the 
average abnormal volume on day 0 is about 286% of the normal volume. This suggests 
that the recommendations induce substantial trading activity.
The release of analysts’ upgrade and downgrade recommendations also 
significantly increases trading activity. For the upgrade sample, the average abnormal 
volume is about 637% of the normal volume, and is about 326% of the normal volume
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for the downgrade sample. Even though more information content is associated, upgrade 
recommendations create higher rate of abnormal trading volume. This may be due to the 
restrictions which many institutional investors face in investing less known firms.
Table 15 also shows cumulative excess returns over several selected intervals for 
analysts’ recommendations. For firms with initial coverages, there is no statistically 
significant price reversal, whereas firms with upgrade recommendations indicate 
significant price reversal throughout the three intervals, pre-, event-, and post-event 
period. Downgrade recommendations show that there is no price reversal for the overall 
period.
3.4.4 Firm Size Effect
In this section, I show how firm size influences the valuation effects of analysts’ 
recommendations. For each category of recommendations, I divide the sample firms into 
two equal subsamples: one for large firms, the other for small firms. Firm size is 
measured as total market value of equity as of the end of 1990 and obtained from the 
CRSP tapes.
Panel A of Table 14 reports the results for the sample of initial coverages. On 
days -1 and 0, the average abnormal return for the subsample of large firms is 4.96 
percent. This is smaller than the abnormal returns for the overall sample (8.71 %) on the 
release day. On the other hand, small firms experience a much larger abnormal return 
of 12.43% on the release day. This is consistent with the argument of Atiase (1985) and 
others who posit that since less information is produced about small firms, the expected
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percentage change in stock prices in response to public release is a decreasing function 
of firm size.
Panel A also shows similar size effects associated with analysts’ upgrade and 
downgrade recommendations. Small firms experience statistically significant 7.29 
percent abnormal returns, whereas large firms have only a 3.11 percent return on the 
release day. Size effects for the firms with downgrade recommendations are similar. 
On the release day, there is -3.67 percent abnormal return for the large firms and -9.17 
percent for the small firms. As shown in Panel A, the differences in valuation effects 
between large firms and small firms are statistically significant for all the three categories 
of analysts’ recommendations. Overall, small firms experience larger market reactions 
to analysts’ recommendations than large firms. This is consistent with previous studies 
(see, for example, Slovin, Johnson, and Glasscock (1992), Atiase (1985), Bajaj and Vijh 
(1990)), which show that smaller firms experience a larger price reaction to public 
announcements.
On the other hand, Panel B shows that there is no significant difference in the 
financial markets (NYSE/AMEX vs NASDAQ), even though abnormal returns for firms 
in the NASDAQ are large than those in the NYSE/AMEX.
3.4.5 Regression Analysis
I employ multivariate regressions to further investigate the major determinants of 
the valuation effects of analysts’ recommendations. As discussed in the previous section, 
firm size is an important determinant. Furthermore, various theories indicate that, along
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with firm size, trading volume and return volatility should also be major determinants 
of the valuation effects of announcements. The theories are presented below.
Trading volume, on the one hand, may proxy for liquidity and information flow. 
Hence, as noted by Barber and Loeffler (1993), the valuation effect of analysts’ 
recommendations should be inversely related to trading volume. This is because firms 
with greater liquidity should be less affected by naive traders’ trading on analysts’ 
recommendations. Also, firms with greater information flow should be less likely to be 
mispriced.
On the other hand, as Bhushan (1989) points out, noise increases with trading 
volume. Hence, analysts’ recommendations on firms with more normal trading volume 
should be more informative. Therefore, holding other things constant, the revaluation 
associated with analysts’ recommendations would be larger for firms with more trading 
volume. Return volatility may proxy for two factors. First, it can proxy for noise in a 
firm’s price system; i.e., the more the noise, the higher the volatility. Second, return 
volatility may reflect uncertainty in the firm’s future prospects. These proxies suggest 
that t' lrginal information content of analysts’ recommendations should be positively 
related to return volatility.
Table 16 presents the results from cross-sectional regressions for the initial 
coverage sample. The dependent variable in each regression is the two-day abnormal 
return of analysts’ recommendations. The second regression in the table includes firm 
size, trading volume, and return volatility as explanatory variables. Firm size is 
measured as the market capitalization of the firm at the end of 1990. Trading volume
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is the average daily trading in the estimation period from days -225 through -26. Return 
volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns, which is also estimated in the 
estimation period. In the regressions, I use the natural logarithms of firm size and of 
trading volume.
In EQ.2, as expected, the two-day abnormal return is inversely related to firm 
size, and is positively related to return volatility. Consistent with Bhushan’s (1989) 
hypothesis, the two-day abnormal return is positively related to trading volume. 
Surprisingly, these three variables are able to explain more than 44.35% of cross- 
sectional variation in the two-day abnormal return associated with analysts’ initial 
coverages.
After controlling for the effects of these three major determinants, the reputation 
of the brokerage house the analyst is affiliated with has a no significant effect on the two- 
day return. This no relation is inconsistent with the prediction of Klein and Leffler 
(1981). They posit that the market perceives "reputation" as a valuable asset, thus 
implying that recommendations by brokerage houses with more reputation induce larger 
price reactions from market participants.
The regression models do not include the number of analysts following a firm in 
this analysis because of multicollinearity. The correlation between this variable and firm 
size is about 0.8. When I include the number of analysts in a model, it causes the 
standard error to increase and lowers the significance level for most coefficients related 
to firm size, while the R2 o f the regression does not change. For any other pairs of 
variables used in the regressions, the correlation is no more than 0.5.
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The regression results are quite similar for the sample of analysts’ upgrade 
recommendations. Table 17 reports the regression results of the combined samples of 
initial coverages and upgrade recommendations. Even after controlling for firm size, 
trading volume, and return volatility, I find that the two-day return is higher for analysts’ 
initial coverages than for upgrade recommendations. This confirms my earlier 
conclusion that, on average, initial coverages have greater marginal information content 
than upgrade recommendations.
Table 19 reports the results for the sample of downgrade recommendations. The 
two-day return is positively related to firm size, and is inversely related to trading 
volume. Since downgrade recommendations tend to generate negative revaluation, the 
results are consistent with the small firm effect; i.e ., a downgrade recommendation has 
a larger negative effect on smaller firms. The results are also consistent with Bhushan’s 
(1989) hypothesis in that analysts’ downgrade recommendations have a greater negative 
effect on firms with higher normal trading volume.
3.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this essay, three important issues related to analysts’ initial coverage were 
examined. First, I find that the average abnormal return on the release day of analysts’ 
initial coverages via the DJNW is 7.46%. This magnitude of abnormal return is about 
twice the level of abnormal returns reported in earlier studies on analysts’ 
recommendations. Also, the average abnormal return is greater than that of the upgrade 
recommendations (4.43%). The evidence is interpreted as indicating that initial
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Table 10
E xcess return, with Corrado’s nonparametric rank test and Boehm er’s parametric test,
the proportion o f  positive excess returns, and cumulative excess returns for firms with
analysts’ initial coverages (N = 9 4 ) .
The recommendations were released through the Dow Jones News W ire in 1991. The 














-25 -0.018 0.28 0.07 46.8 -0.018
- 2 0 -0.320 -1.55 -1.06 41.5 0 . 0 2 2
-15 -0.104 -0.09 0 . 2 0 47.9 -1505
- 1 0 -0.146 -0.56 -0.41 44.7 -1.491
-5 0.178 -0.38 0.04 48.9 -1.369
-4 -0.169 -0.34 -0.49 44.7 -1.538
-3 0.466 0 . 8 8 0.64 50.0 -1.072
- 2 0.007 0.32 -0.37 39.4 -1.065
- 1 1.237 2.80*** 1.93* 53.2 0.172
0 7.461 11.61*** 9.53*** 90.4 7.633
1 0.381 1.07 0 . 6 6 52.1 8.015
2 0.136 0 . 6 6 0.24 47.9 8.151
3 -0.090 0.48 0.36 52.1 8.061
4 -0.123 -0.89 -0.59 44.7 7.938
5 -0.172 -0.35 -0.29 42.6 7.766
1 0 0.520 1.98** 1.03 54.3 7.828
15 0.181 0.69 0.38 46.8 8.267
2 0 -0.798 -1.73 -1.35 39.4 7.073
25 0.418 0.99 0.69 54.3 7.171
* significant at 0.1 % level
** significant at 0.05%  level
*** significant at 0.01%  level
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Table 11
Excess return, with Corrado’s nonparametric rank test and Boehm er’s parametric test,
the proportion o f  positive excess returns, and cumulative excess returns for firms with
analysts’ downgrade recommendations (N = 1 4 1 ).
The recommendations were released through the Dow Jones News Wire in 1991. The 














-25 0.082 0.35 0.51 50.35 0.082
- 2 0 0.141 0.93 0 . 6 8 51.06 -0.297
-15 -0.418 -2 .2 0 ** -1.42 39.72 -1.911
- 1 0 0.084 0.90 0.61 50.35 -1.960
-5 -0.281 -0.60 -0.59 41.84 -2.842
-4 0 . 1 1 0 0.27 0.62 50.35 -2.732
-3 0.114 0.80 0.54 51.06 -2.618
- 2 0.234 1.90 1.39 56.03 -2.384
- 1 -2 . 1 0 0 -6.08*** -4.33*** 22.70 -4.485
0 -4.390 - 1 1  91*** _9 06*** 12.77 -8.875
1 -0.650 -1.85* -0.84 43.97 -9.524
2 -0.325 - 1 . 0 1 -0.39 46.10 -9.850
3 -0.125 -0.17 -0 . 0 2 47.52 -9.974
4 0.032 0.54 0.34 48.23 -9.942
5 -0.003 -0.29 -0.47 41.13 -9.945
1 0 -0.699 -3.05*** -2 .2 2 ** 38.30 -11.411
15 -0.094 -1.16 -0.35 50.35 -13.038
2 0 0.049 0.85 0.30 43.97 -14.076
25 -0.414 -1.42 -0.78 42.55 -15.306
* significant at 0.1 % level
** significant at 0.05%  level
*** significant at 0.01 % level
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Table 12
Excess return, with Corrado’s nonparametric rank test and Boehm er’s parametric test,
the proportion o f  positive excess returns, and cumulative excess returns for firms with
analysts’ upgrade recommendations (N = 3 3 9 ).
The recommendations were released through the Dow Jones News W ire in 1991. The 














-25 -0.066 - 1 . 2 0 -0.63 0.437 -0.066
- 2 0 -0 . 1 0 2 -0.61 -0.44 0.468 -1.019
-15 -0.018 -0.17 0.16 0.489 -2.047
- 1 0 -0.167 -1.76 - 1 . 1 0 0.424 -2.499
-5 -0.162 -0.71 -0.30 0.447 -3.551
-4 -0.235 -0.65 -0.55 0.447 -3.786
-3 -0.324 -1.87* -0 . 8 6 0.447 -4.110
- 2 -0.058 -0.77 -0.83 0.458 -4.168
- 1 0.771 3  0 2 *** 2 .2 1 ** 0.558 -3.397
0 4.437 12 95*** 11.14*** 0.834 1.040
1 0.443 2  2 9 *** 1 .6 6 * 0.550 1.482
2 -0.184 -1.39 -0.81 0.463 1.298
3 -0.327 -2.64*** -1.28 0.442 0.971
4 -0.423 -2.36** -1.60 0.437 0.548
5 -0.243 -0.80 -0.32 0.479 0.305
1 0 -0.281 -2.48** -1.38 0.439 -0.106
15 -0.274 -1.50 -0.91 0.449 -0.939
2 0 -0.167 -2.23** -0.76 0.451 -2.123
25 -0.325 -1.41 -0.78 0.467 -3.560
* significant at 0.1%  level
** significant at 0.05%  level
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Excess volume and Corrado’s nonparametric rank test for firms with analysts’ initial 
coverages, upgrade and downgrade recommendations.
The recommendations were released through the Dow Jones News W ire in 1991. The 




oooCOII£ N =  141
Event Excess Corrado’s Excess Corrado’s Excess Corrado’s
day volume rank test volume rank test volume rank test
-25 26.12 0.94 28.37 0.32 10.87 0.45
-24 21.76 0.84 32.17 0 . 6 6 38.54 1 . 1 2
-15 23.80 0.63 0.59 -0.19 19.89 1.35
- 1 0 87.32 0.95 60.45 0.55 13.61 0.44
-5 43.80 0 . 8 8 109.59 1.14 35.28 1.08
-4 56.13 1.09 62.36 0.71 35.43 1 . 1 1
-3 44.28 1.33 61.25 1.15 26.42 0.72
- 2 46.01 1.40 108.94 1.44 56.58 1.08
- 1 99.54 2.82*** 132.35 1.83* 77.11 1.53
0 286.30 5.83*** 637.16 5.33*** 326.75 6 . 1 0 ***
1 158.62 4  2 1 *** 415.38 4.07*** 149.06 4.20***
2 106.63 2  9 9 *** 241.50 2.57** 92.43 3.06***
3 98.01 2  3 9 *** 187.07 2  7 2 *** 77.80 3.04***
4 87.81 2.56** 135.91 2.35** 51.28 2 .0 0 **
5 71.50 2.07** 156.42 2.37** 48.68 1.57
1 0 42.22 1.92* 141.17 1.74* 55.82 1.81*
15 73.54 2.29** 174.74 2.03** 50.07 1.84*
2 0 56.82 2 9 9 ** 118.57 1.48 71.29 2.31**
25 57.00 1 .6 6 * 124.82 1.64 29.11 1.42
* significant at 0 . 1  % level
** significant at 0.05% level
*** significant at 0 .0 1 % level
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Table 14
Two-day announcement period excess returns by firm size and by market. Samples are 
subgrouped into small and large firms, based on the median size of the samples.












for large firms 
(%)
4.96 3.11 -3.69
t-value 4.03*** 4.85*** 















1 0 . 2 2 5.64 -2.99
t-value -1.54 -1.54 0.25
* significant at 0 . 1  % level
** significant at 0.05% level
*** significant at 0 . 0 1  % level
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Table 15
Mean cumulative excess returns (%) over selected intervals in analysts’ recommendations 
with initial coverage, upgrade, and downgrade.
Cumulative excess return from day i to day j - (id)
-25,-3 - 1 , 0 1,5 6 , 1 0 11,25 1,25
Initial Mean -1.07 8.69 0.13 0.06 -0 . 6 6 0.46
coverage
t-stat -0.90 12.15*** 0.56 0.59 -0.89 -0.28
% > 0 44.68 90.42 56.38 44.68 51.06 48.94
Upgrade Mean -4.11 5.21 -0.73 -0.41 -3.45 -4.59
recommend.
t-stat -6.28*** 11.51*** 1 VO on * -1.69* -5.17** -5.19*
% > 0 38.16 81.84 47.89 44.47 38.68 40.78
Downgrade Mean -2.61 -6.49 -1.07 -1.46 -3.89 -6.43
recommend.
t-stat -2.31** -12.36** -1.35 -2 98*** -3 91*** 4.85***
% > 0 41.13 10.63 49.65 39.01 34.04 30.49
* significant at 0 . 1  % level
** significant at 0.05% level
*** significant at 0 . 0 1  % level
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Table 16
Results of regression of abnormal returns (ARi l=(.lt0)) on variables of firm size, trading 
volume, standard deviation of return, cumulative abnormal return in the post­
announcement period, and reputation of brokerage house for a sample of 94 initial 
coverage recommendations for NYSE- and AMEX- listed and NASDAQ firms.
Independent
variables E Q .l EQ.2 EQ.3
S izea -0.038 -0.023 -0.018
(-6.78)*** (-3.17)*** (-2.47)***
T radingb 0.039 0 . 0 2 1 0.017
volume (5.07)*** (2 .2 1 )** (1.89)*
a  of returnc 2.250 2.450
(3.37)*** (3.65)***




Intercept 0.107 0.054 0.026
(1.03) (0.54) (0.26)
Adjusted
R2 37.79% 44.35% 46.34%
F f 28.33 24.91 16.54
a firm size is the log of the market value of equity defined as share price multiplied by
shares outstanding for the year, 1990. 
b trading volume is defined as log of one plus mean trading volume over the estimation 
period, t=-225,-26. 
c standard deviation of return over the estimation period, t=-225,-26. 
d reputation dummy — 1 if included in top 10 equity underwriters in 1991, 0 otherwise. 
c cumulative return in the period, t= -25,-3. 
f all the F-values are statistically significant at a =0.05 level.
*,**,***, significant at a = 0 . 1,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 17
Results of regression of abnormal returns (AR; l=(_, 0)) on variables of firm size, trading 
volume, standard deviation of return, cumulative abnormal return in the post­
announcement period, and reputation of brokerage house for a sample of 474 initial 
coverage and upgrade recommendations for NYSE- and AMEX- listed and NASDAQ 
firms.
Independent
variables E Q .l EQ.2 EQ.3
Size0 -0.026 -0.016 -0.015
(-10.44)*** (-4.77)*** (-4.66)***
Tradingb 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 1 1 0.013
volume (5.57)*** (2.96)*** (3.22)***
a of returnc 1.765 1.676
(4.53)*** (4.34)***






Intercept 0.167 0.076 0.056
(3.93)*** (1.65) ( 1 .2 1 )
Adjusted ■
R2 18.90% 2 2 .2 2 % 24.72%
F 8 54.58 44.79 26.17
“ firm size is the log of the market value of equity defined as share price multiplied by 
shares outstanding for the year, 1990. 
b trading volume is defined as log of one plus mean trading volume over the estimation 
period, t=-225,-26. 
c standard deviation of return over the estimation period, t=-225,-26. 
d reputation dummy =  1 if included in top 10 equity underwriters in 1991, 0 otherwise.
c cumulative return in the period, t= -25 ,-3 . 
f dummy =  1 if initial coverage, 0  otherwise.
E all the F-values are statistically significant at a —0.05  level.
*,**,***, significant at a = 0 . 1,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 18
Results of regression of abnormal returns (ARjil=(.li0)) on variables of firm size, trading 
volume, standard deviation of return, cumulative abnormal return in the post­
announcement period, and reputation of brokerage house for a sample o f 380 upgrade 
recommendations for NYSE- and AMEX- listed and NASDAQ firms.
Independent
variables E Q .l EQ.2 EQ.3
S izea -0 . 0 2 1 -0.016 -0.016
(_7 7 9 )*** (-4.12)*** (-4.24)***
Tradingb 0.016 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 1 1
volume (4.00)*** (2.59)*** (2.64)***
a of returnc 1.185 1.142
(2.46)** (2.38)**




Intercept 0.151 0.087 0.095
(3.16)*** (1.61) (1.76)*
Adjusted
R2 13.73% 14.90% 16.29%
F f 30.36 22.53 15.36
“ firm size is the log of the market value of equity defined as share price multiplied by
shares outstanding for the year, 1990. 
b trading volume is defined as log of one plus mean trading volume over the estimation 
period, t=-225,-26.
0 standard deviation of return over the estimation period, t=-225,-26. 
d reputation dummy = 1 if included in top 10 equity underwriters in 1991, 0 otherwise. 
e cumulative return in the period, t= -25,-3 . 
f all the F-values are statistically significant at a =0.05 level.
*,**,***, significant at a = 0 . 1,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 19
Results o f regression of abnormal returns (ARj l=(.1>0)) on variables of firm size, trading 
volume, standard deviation o f return, cumulative abnormal return in the post­
announcement period, and reputation of brokerage house for a sample of 141 downgrade 
recommendations for NYSE- and AMEX- listed and NASDAQ firms.
Independent
variables E Q .l EQ.2 EQ.3
Sizea 0.025 0.026 0.026
(8.17)*** (5.43)*** (5.72)***
Tradingb -0.029 -0.029 -0.029
volume (-6.63)*** (-6 .2 0 )*** (-6.30)***
a  of re tu rnc 0.223 0.577
(0.30) (0.79)




Intercept -0.038 -0.052 -0.072
(-0.60) (-0 .6 6 ) (-0.94)
Adjusted
R 2 38.26% 37.85% 42.47%
F f 43.77 29.01 21.38
a firm size is the log of the market value of equity defined as share price multiplied by 
shares outstanding for the year, 1990.
b trading volume is defined as log of one plus mean trading volume over the estimation 
period, t=-225,-26.
c standard deviation of return over the estimation period, t=-225,-26. 
d reputation dummy =  1 if  included in top 10 equity underwriters in 1991, 0 otherwise. 
6 cumulative return in the period, t= -25,-3 . 
f all the F-values are statistically significant at a =0.05 level.
*,**,***, significant at a = 0 . 1,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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coverages convey more marginal information content than that of recommendations on 
firms already in the analysts’ lists.
Second, firm size is an important factor in determining the valuation effect of 
analysts’ initial coverages. When the sample of initial coverages are separated into two 
subsamples based on firm size, the abnormal return for small firms is 12.43%, whereas 
for large firms it is 4.96% . The difference in the abnormal returns of the two 
subsamples is statistically significant. A similar size effect is observed for the sample 
of upgrade recommendations. For the upgrade sample, the abnormal return for small 
firms is 7.29% and that of large firms is 3.11%.
Third, a positive relation exists between the normal trading volume and the 
abnormal return of firms with analysts’ recommendations. The result is consistent with 
Bhushan (1989) who argues that noise increases with normal trading volume and that 
analysts’ recommendations on high volume firms have higher marginal information 
content.
Chapter 4 
Informed Trading: Empirical Tests
4.1 Introduction
Many brokerage houses and investment advisory companies employ financial 
analysts to collect and analyze information about firms they cover. Based on their 
assessments, analysts then make recommendations for clients to buy, hold, or sell firms’ 
securities. Extant studies find that positive (negative) valuation effects are associated 
with buy (sell) recommendations, suggesting that analysts are able to produce valuable 
information for their clients.
Analysts’ recommendations are usually sent to their clients first before the news 
is released to the general public. Hence, before the public knows the recommendations, 
the clients can be said to possess private information. The clients may act as informed 
traders and trade on the recommendations. The two-tier dissemination of analysts’ 
recommendations thus provides a unique setting for examining issues related to informed 
trading.
The type of analyst recommendations studied in this essay is initial coverages with 
a buy recommendation, which were released via the Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) in 
1991. For this type of recommendation, the DJNW usually indicated when the 
recommendations were sent to clients and when the news was released via the DJNW to 
the public. In most cases, the recommendations were disseminated to clients in the early 
morning before the market opened, and later the news were reported on the DJNW on
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the same day. Hence, there was several hours for informed traders to act on the 
recommendations.
The first objective of this study is to empirically examine the question: how 
quickly is private information incorporated into market prices? Kyle (1985) posits that, 
in a market with a monopolistic insider who attempts to maximize his/her profits, private 
information will be gradually incorporated into security prices. Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) extend Kyle’s model and hypothesize that competition among 
informed traders would cause them to trade so that private information will be rapidly 
impounded in security prices. Since brokerage houses’ clients who receive analyst 
recommendations are likely to compete for profits, the data thus allow us to empirically 
test Holden and Subrahmanyam’s hypothesis.
The second objective is to empirically compare the efficiency of the two trading 
mechanisms, the call market vs. the dealership market, in dealing with private 
information. Since analysts’ recommendations are disseminated to clients before the 
market opens, it is important that the trading mechanism at the opening transaction is 
efficient in incorporating information. On the NYSE and AMEX, the opening 
transaction is conducted in a call clearing procedure.
That is, before the market opens, buy and sell orders can be submitted, and then 
batched for execution at the opening call. The specialist, based on accumulated buy and 
sell orders, determines a price to clear the market (see, for example, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) for details). However, the opening trade 
on the NASDAQ/OTC market is conducted in a dealership market where competing
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market makers quote a bid price for sell orders and an ask price for buy orders. 
Madhavan (1992) posits that when there is high information asymmetry in the market, 
the call market is more efficient in reflecting private information than the dealership 
market. Madhavan’s hypothesis is tested in this essay by comparing the price behavior 
in both the call market on the NYSE and AMEX and the dealership market on the 
NASDAQ/OTC market.
The third objective o f this study is to examine the choice of trade size by 
informed traders. Recently, Barclay and Warner (1993) propose the stealth hypothesize 
in that informed traders choose their trades in medium size. They argue that it is 
unlikely that traders with valuable private information will limit their total trading activity 
to small positions because the profit potential from these positions is small.
On the other hand, because the price concession (or the expected price impact of 
trades) for a large trade by an informed trader could be substantial, large share positions 
are likely to be broken up into several trades. Transaction costs and delay costs would 
prevent informed traders from engaging in a sequence of small trade sizes. Therefore, 
Barclay and Warner suggest that the medium trade size (500 to 9,900 shares) is the most 
appropriate trade size for informed trades.
Barclay and Warner examine preannouncement trading for a sample of tender- 
offer targets and find evidence consistent with the stealth trading hypothesis. However, 
the preannouncement period may not be a good period to examine the behavior of 
informed trading since it is not known when and whether or not the private information 
about a tender offer is used in trading. This study’s sample of analyst recommendations
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does not have this drawback and, thus, can provide a stronger test of the stealth trading 
hypothesis.
The remainder of this study is planned as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample 
selection and data used in this study. Section 3 presents empirical evidence of the speed 
of the price adjustment to private information.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Sample Selection
Our sample consists of 87 analysts’ initial coverages with a buy recommendation, 
which were disseminated through the Dow Jones News Wire in 1991. The selection 
procedure is described as follows. Initially, a search was conducted for news on analysts’ 
recommendations issued in 1991 through the Dew Jones News Retrieval using the key 
words "analyst$ and initia$ and cov$." This results in 115 documents of analyst initial 
coverages with a buy recommendation . 6 Each document contains the date and time of 
recommendations released to the Broad Tape, company symbol, name of the analyst and 
the brokerage house the analyst is affiliated with, and the content of the recommendation. 
Appendix A exhibits a typical initial buy recommendation.
In order to examine the behavior of informed traders, it is critical to know when 
a recommendation is privately accessible and when the information is public available. 
Hence, of the 115 recommendations, 87 cases are selected which meet the following two 
criteria: 1) the news released to the DJNW indicates that the recommendation was
6 In some cases, "buy" recommendations have different forms, such as "outperform", "strong buy", 
"favorable", or "trading buy". Some brokerage houses use a code system to recommend. For example, 
PaineWebber rates stocks on a five-point scale, from l(buy) to 5(sell).
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disseminated to clients early that day; (2) the firm was included in the 1991 ISSM tapes. 
Among the 28 cases discarded from the sample, 25 cases did not clearly indicate the time 
when the recommendations were released to clients; and three cases involve non-NMS 
firms. The transaction data o f non-NMS firms are not included in the ISSM tapes.
The ISSM tapes are an amalgamation of several data sources, with the primary 
component, the trades and quotes data, coming from the Securities Industry Corporation 
(SIAC). Each trade or quote is time-stamped to the nearest second and carries a code 
identifying the originating exchange. Trades and quotes originating from regional 
exchanges are excluded. The transaction price and trading volume are provided for each 
trade; and for each quote, the bid price and ask price are available on the ISSM tapes. 
In this study, both the transaction price and the quote price series reactions in response 
to the release of analysts’ recommendations are analyzed.
4.2.2 Sample Characteristics
The number of brokerage houses which issued initial coverages in the sample is 
34. The top four brokerage houses on the list are Morgan Stanley, Shearson Lehman, 
Smith Barney, and Bear Sterns, which issued 10, 10, 9, and 8  recommendations in the 
sample, respectively. Among the 87 initial coverages, 42 are for firms listed on the New 
York or American Stock Exchanges, and 45 are for firms traded on the NASDAQ/OTC 
market.
The sample firm characteristics are presented in Table 20, which includes the 
following variables: average daily trading volume, average daily trading frequency, 
average trade price, average dollar bid-ask spread, and average relative bid-ask spread.
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For each variable, I report the mean and median of the sample firms in three different 
periods: pre-event period from days -50 to -3, the event period (i.e., day 0), and the 
post-event period from days 3 to 10. For example, mean daily trading volume increases 
from 157,000 shares in the pre-event period to 423,100 shares on the release day of 
analysts’ recommendations and then decreases to 225,500 shares in the post-event period. 
The mean trading frequency also substantially increases from 8 6  trades per day in the 
pre-event period to 219 trades per day in the event period and then decreases to 125 
trades per day in the post-event period. It is interpreted that trading activity increases 
during the release day of analysts’ initial coverage, compared with that in the pre-event 
period. The abnormal trading activity in the post-event period decreases to the level of 
pre-event period.
When spreads (dollar spread, effective dollar spread, relative spread, and effective 
relative spread) are measured for the three periods, spreads of the post-event period are 
smaller than those in the pre-event period. It appears that analysts’ initial coverage 
reduces spreads which represents liquidity of stocks. Thus, it is interpreted that analysts’ 
recommendations benefit the covered firms not only with price revaluation but also with 
liquidity increase.
4.3 The Speed of Price Adjustment
4.3.1 Transaction Prices
This section addresses the question of how quickly stock prices incorporate private 
information contained in analysts’ recommendations. To answer the question, the return 
at the opening trade (i.e., the overnight return) and 5-minute return series on the release
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Table 20
Statistics of the sample of firms which had favorable initial coverage by analysts in 1991. 
The sample consists of 42 NYSE/AMEX firms and 45 NASDAQ firms.
Pre-event period 




(days + 3  to +10)




1,570 656 4,231 2,862 2,255 1,108
Daily trading 
frequency
8 6 38 219 134 125 72
Avg. daily 
trade price
















1.44 1.04 1.37 1.14 0.87 0.67
“ dollar spread =  ask price - bid price 
b effective dollar spread =  2 1P - Q | , where P is the transaction price and Q =  (ask +  
bid) / 2
0 relative spread =  (ask price - bid price)/Q
d effective relative spread =  2 |log(P) - log(Q) | , where log is the natural logarithm.
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day of analysts’ recommendations are examined. The opening trade is important 
because, as described by Marton (1987), analysts’ recommendations are usually 
disseminated to clients before the market opens at 9:30 a.m. Hence, the opening trade 
is the first trade that is going to reflect the private information. Since the trading 
mechanisms are different between the NYSE/AMEX and the NASDAQ/OTC market, the 
return series are analyzed separately for each markets.
The mean-adjusted method is used to compute abnormal returns. Wood, Mclnish, 
and Ord (1985) and Harris (1986) show that the opening trade returns and the last trade 
returns tend to behave differently from the returns of trades in between. For this reason, 
the intraday pattern is taken into consideration when computing mean-adjusted returns. 
Based on the intraday pattern o f returns, three mean returns are computed for each firm 
in the estimation period from days -50 to -3.
They are the mean (overnight) return at the first trade, the mean return in the last 
five minutes, and the mean five-minute return in between. If a firm has no trade in a 
given five-minute interval, the return in that interval is set to zero. The abnormal return, 
or mean-adjusted return, for firm i at time
t is then measured as ARit= R it - MRis, where s =  l if t is the opening trade, and s= 2  if 
t is in the last five minutes, and s= 3  if t is in between.
Table 21 reports average abnormal returns around the opening trade on the release 
day of analysts’ recommendations for the NYSE and AMEX firms. The event time is 
set to be zero at the opening trade. The event time 1, 2, 3 ,..., indicates first, second,
65
and third five-minute intervals after the opening trade, and so on. Conversely, the event 
time -1, -2, -3, . . . ,  indicates that the last, the second to the last, and the third to the last 
five-minute trading intervals one day before the news release day. The average abnormal 
return in a given interval is obtained by averaging across sample firms. A t-test (with 
standard error computed across sample firms in that interval) and a sum rank test to 
indicate the significance of the average abnormal return in that interval are used.
According to Table 21, the average abnormal return at t= 0 , i.e ., the opening 
trade, is 3.78%, which is very significantly different from zero. About 93% of sample 
firms react positively at the opening trade. The average abnormal return at t - 1  is 
0.57%, which is also very significant. The average abnormal returns in other intervals 
are all very small. The results indicate that most of private information contained in 
analysts’ recommendations is reflected in stock prices at the opening trade and trades 
within five, minutes thereafter. The evidence is consistent with Holden and 
Subrahmanyam’s (1992) hypothesis that competition among informed traders causes 
private information to be rapidly impounded into prices.
Similar results are found for the NASDAQ/OTC firms, as shown in Table 22 
The average abnormal return at t= 0 , the opening trade, is 3.63%. The average 
abnormal returns in the next two five-minute intervals are 1.61% and 1.19%. These 
three abnormal returns are all significant at the 1 % level. The abnormal returns in other 
intervals are very small and insignificant. The results suggest that most of the 
information of analysts’ recommendations are incorporated into prices within ten minutes 
after the opening trade on the NASDAQ/OTC market.
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The results in Table 21 and 22 imply that both the organized exchanges (i.e., 
NYSE and AMEX) and the OTC market react very quickly to informed trading. It takes 
only about five minutes for the NYSE and AMEX stocks and about ten minutes for the 
NASDAQ/OTC stocks to reflect the private information of analysts’ recommendations. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the speed of price adjustment, the results appear to slightly 
favor the organized exchanges. The slower price adjustment on the NASDAQ/OTC 
market may be attributable to the fact that the fragmentation and multiple market makers 
on the OTC market allow informed traders to better conceal their trading. It is 
interpreted that this then leads market makers on the OTC market to a slower discovery 
of informed trading.
Although the opening trade is used as the starting point on both markets, the time 
of the opening trade on day 0 , the release day of analysts’ recommendations, on the 
NYSE/AMEX is quite different from that on the NASDAQ/OTC market. The opening 
trade for the average (median) firm in the NYSE/AMEX sample occurs about ten (seven) 
minutes after the market opens at 9:30 a.m. This result indicates that, on average, it 
takes about ten minutes for the specialist to clear the market at the opening trade. For 
the sample firms, the time ranges from zero minutes to a maximum of 55 minutes.
In the NASDAQ/OTC sample, the time between the opening trade and 9:30 
ranges from zero to four minutes with the mean and median equal to 0 . 8  and 0  minute. 
The results indicate that the opening trade for most NASDAQ/OTC firms takes place at 
9:30 a.m. when the market opens for trading.
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The implication is that, although the call market used by the NYSE/AMEX in the 
opening trade is every efficient in revealing private information, it takes time for the 
specialist to clear the market. Furthermore, although the dealership market used by the 
NASDAQ/OTC market may not be as efficient as the call market, the dealership market 
is ready for trading when the market opens.
4.3.2 The Quote Midpoint
The results of the speed of price adjustment to private information are further 
examined using returns computed from the quote midpoint, the average o f bid and ask 
prices. There are two advantages of using quote-midpoint returns. First, returns based 
on quote midpoints are less influenced by bid-ask bounces. Second, quote prices can be 
adjusted even with no trades.
Table 23 presents the average abnormal returns based on the quote midpoint for the 
NYSE/AMEX sample, and Table 24 for the NASDAQ/OTC sample. For the 
NYSE/AMEX sample, I set t= 0  at the first quote revision, which usually occurs right 
after the opening trade. Hence, the return at t= 0  reflects the overnight return, and the 
returns at t=  1, 2, 3, ... are the 5-minute returns. The average abnormal returns at t= 0  
and t = l  are large, 3.79% and 0.72% , and significant. Other abnormal returns are quite 
small and insignificant. The evidence suggests that market makers are able to 
incorporate most of the private information of analysts’ recommendations within five 
minutes after the first quote revision.
For the NASDAQ/OTC market, it should be pointed out that I set t= 0  to be 9:30. 
Since the OTC market opens at 9:30, I intend to see to what extent market makers adjust
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quotes before the market opens. For most sample firms, I observe substantial quote 
revisions before the market opens at 9:30 on the news release day. Since traders can 
submit orders before the market opens, market makers can thus learn from traders even 
before the market opens. Appendix D shows a typical example of quote revisions before 
9:30 on the news release day.
For the NASDAQ/OTC sample, the average abnormal returns are significant at 
t= 0  (3.20%), t=  1 (2.19%), t= 2  (0.68%), and t= 3  (0.34%). These results indicate that 
OTC market makers adjust quote prices to incorporate private information of analysts’ 
recommendations within 15 minutes after the market opens. Surprisingly, about half of 
abnormal returns occur before the market opens. Since the average abnormal return at 
t= 3  is relatively small, the previous statement that most of the information contained in 
analysts’ recommendations is impounded into stock prices within ten minutes on the 
NASDAQ/OTC market is still valid.
On average, the private information period, i.e ., the time between analysts’ 
recommendations released to the public and the market opening at 9:30, is about two 
hours and 38 minutes in the NYSE/AMEX sample, and is about two hours and 51 
minutes in the NASDAQ/OTC market. If it is true that stock prices quickly reflect 
private information of analysts’ recommendations, no valuation effect would be expected 
at the time the news is released via the DJNW to the public.
Indeed, as shown in Table 25 for the NYSE/AMEX sample and in Table 26 for 
the NASDAQ/OTC sample, no abnormal returns when analysts’ recommendations are 
released to the public.
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4.3.3 Comparison of Efficiency (NYSE/AMEX vs NASDAQ)
Table 29 shows that dealers in the NASDAQ adjust before the market opens at 
9:30 in the morning. On the other hand, specialists in the NYSE/AMEX do not adjust 
their quotes before the opening auction clears orders which have been accumulated since 
the previous market closing. The difference in their market mechanism is clearly 
demostrated in Tables 30-33, and Figures 6-9.
As Table 31 and Figure 7 show, there are significant increase in the quote 
adjustement before market opens when compared with the pre- and post-information 
period. In the NYSE/AMEX markets, there is no quote adjustmet before markets opens, 
whereas large increase in trading volume is observed. While slow adjustment in trading 
volume for firms in the NASDAQ occurs, fast adjustment occurs in the trading volume 
for firms in the NYSE/AMEX (Figure 8 ). Within 30 minutes of first trading, most 
abnormal trading activity occurs.
4.3.4 Discussion
In sum, the results in Tables 21 through 26 provide several implications. First, 
the average abnormal returns at the opening trades are more than 3%, implying that 
analysts’ initial coverages have substantial information content.
Second, it takes at most 15 minutes for the market to absorb the information 
contained in analysts’ recommendations, implying that stock prices rapidly adjust to 
private information. The evidence is consistent with Holden and Subrahmanyam’s (1992) 
prediction.
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Third, for the NYSE/AMEX sample, most of the abnormal returns occur at the 
opening trade. Besides the large trading activity in the opening call, abnormal returns 
are relatively small. These results can be interpreted that the call market at the opening 
transaction is able to reveal most of the information contained in analysts’ 
recommendations.
Fourth, based on quote revisions, I find that about half of the abnormal return in 
the NASDAQ/OTC sample occurs before the market opens. This implies that market 
makers are able to perceive some private information even before trading begins.
Fifth, for the NASDAQ/OTC sample, the abnormal return at the first trade is 
large. However, I also observe relatively large abnormal returns after the opening 
trades. This implies that a relatively large portion of information is not revealed in the 
first trade in the dealership market. Thus, the call market appears to be slightly more 
efficient than the dealership market in reflecting private information. However, the 
dealership market is ready for trading when the market opens, while in the call market 
it takes about ten minutes for the specialist to clear the market. Therefore, there is a 
tradeoff between efficiency (or the amount of information revealed from one trade in a 
market) and time to complete the trade.
4.4 The Choice of Trade Size
In this section I test the stealth trading hypothesis proposed by Barclay and 
Warner (1993). They argue that informed traders tend to concentrate their trades in 
medium sizes, ranging from 500 to 9,900 shares. To test this hypothesis, I follow 
Barclay and W arner’s procedure to divide trades into small size if a trade is from 100
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Table 21
Five minute interval abnormal returns, proportion of positive returns, and cumulative 
abnormal returns of 42 NYSE/AMEX firms whose initial coverage appeared on the 
Broad Tape in 1991. 0 in five minute interval refers to the first trade (overnight return) 









- 2 0 -0 . 0 2 -0.28 0.33 -0 . 0 2
-15 -0.06 -1.51 0.40 -0 . 1 1
- 1 0 0 . 0 2 0.35 0.40 -0.08
-9 -0.04 -0.95 0.33 -0 . 1 2
- 8 0 . 1 1 1.73 0.45 -0 . 0 1
-7 -0.08 -1.54 0.38 -0.09
- 6 0.08 1.67 0.45 -0 . 0 1
-5 0 . 0 2 0.36 0.40 0 . 0 2
-4 0 . 0 1 0.35 0.31 0 . 0 2
-3 0.04 0.96 0.36 0.07
- 2 -0.06 -0.81 0.31 0 . 0 1
-1 -0 . 0 2 -0.91 0.40 -0 . 0 1
0 3.78 6.30** 0.93 3.77
1 0.57 2.93** 0.57 4.34
2 0.16 0.95 0.45 4.49
3 0 . 1 0 0.57 0.40 4.60
4 0 . 0 1 0.08 0.33 4.61
5 0 . 2 0 0.79 0.43 4.81
6 -0 . 0 1 -0.03 0.40 4.81
7 0.32 2 .0 1 * 0.48 5.13
8 -0.15 -1.38 0.40 4.98
9 -0 . 1 1 -1.38 0.38 4.87
1 0 0 . 0 1 0.06 0.48 4.87
15 0 . 0 2 0.41 0.38 5.02
2 0 -0.03 -0.46 0.43 5.46
significant at a = 0 .0 5  level
significant at a = 0 . 0 1 level.
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Table 22
Five minute interval abnormal returns, proportion o f  positive returns, and cumulative






Proportion of Cumulative 
positive returns(%)returns(%)
- 2 0 0.35 1 . 6 6 0.44 0.35
-15 0.04 0 . 2 2 0.33 0 . 1 2
- 1 0 0.46 1.97* 0.39 0.43
-9 -0.13 -0.81 0.28 0.30
- 8 -0 . 0 2 -0.14 0.33 0.28
-7 0.09 0.50 0.39 0.36
- 6 -0.23 -1.82 0 . 2 2 0.13
-5 -0.06 -0.37 0.33 0.07
-4 0.25 1.04 0.28 0.32
-3 0.13 1.38 0.33 0.45
- 2 -0 . 0 1 -0.06 0.42 0.43
-1 0.06 0.32 0.33 0.50
0 3.63 4.68** 0.78 4.13
1 1.61 3.25** 0.69 5.74
2 1.19 2.98** 0.69 6.93
3 0.49 1.54 0.50 7.42
4 0.25 0.67 0.36 7.66
5 -0.03 -0.13 0.36 7.63
6 0.26 0.97 0.44 7.89
7 -0.30 -1.07 0.36 7.59
8 0.09 0.35 0.47 7.67
9 0.19 0.87 0.39 7.86
1 0 0.15 0.71 0.42 8 . 0 1
15 -0 . 2 2 - 1 . 0 0 0.31 7.94
2 0 0.08 0.26 0.36 8.27
significant at a = 0 .0 5  level
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Five minute interval quote mid-point returns, proportion o f  positive returns, and
cum ulative abnormal returns o f  42 N YSE/A M EX  firms w hose initial coverage appeared





Proportion of Cumulative 
positive returns(%)returns(%)
- 2 0 -0.05 -1.04 0.31 -0.05
-15 0 . 0 2 0.39 0.45 -0 . 1 1
- 1 0 -0 . 0 1 -0.13 0.43 -0.03
-9 0 . 0 1 0.25 0.43 -0 . 0 2
- 8 0.04 1.13 0.40 0 . 0 2
-7 -0.03 -0.90 0.40 -0 . 0 1
- 6 0 . 0 2 0.48 0.40 0 . 0 1
-5 -0.03 -0.70 0.36 -0.03
-4 0 . 0 1 0.52 0.33 -0 . 0 1
-3 -0 . 0 1 -0.78 0.38 -0.03
- 2 0 . 0 2 1.85 0.43 -0 . 0 1
-1 -0 . 0 0 -0.60 0.38 -0 . 0 1
0 3.79 6.79** 0.95 3.78
1 0.72 3.06** 0.60 4.50
2 0 . 1 1 0.82 0.45 4.61
3 0 . 0 0 0.06 0.38 4.62
4 0 . 1 0 1.33 0.52 4.72
5 0 . 1 0 0.45 0.43 4.82
6 0.07 0 . 6 6 0.40 4.89
7 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 2 0.48 4.91
8 0.06 0.47 0.48 4.97
9 -0.06 -1.28 0.38 4.91
1 0 -0 . 1 2 -1.07 0.43 4.78
15 0.06 1 . 1 0 0.43 5.07
2 0 0.04 0.73 0.52 5.42
significant at a = 0 .0 5  level
significant at a = 0 .0 1  level.
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Table 24
Five minute interval quote mid-point return, proportion o f  positive returns, and
cumulative abnormal returns o f  45 N A SD A Q  firms w hose initial coverage appeared on









- 2 0 -0 . 0 2 -1 . 2 1 0.30 -0 . 0 2
-15 -0 . 0 2 -0.44 0.30 -0.04
- 1 0 0 . 0 1 0.74 0.30 0.14
-9 0 . 0 2 0 . 8 6 0.32 0.16
- 8 0.03 0.72 0.32 0.18
-7 0.06 0.82 0.32 0.24
- 6 -0 . 0 1 -0.32 0.32 0.24
-5 0.07 0.79 0.34 0.31
-4 0 . 0 2 1.56 0.34 0.33
-3 0 . 1 1 1.50 0.39 0.44
- 2 0 . 1 0 2.16* 0.43 0.54
-1 0.07 1.82 0.41 0.61
0 3.20 4.80** 0.84 3.81
1 2.19 4.81** 0.70 6 . 0 0
2 0 . 6 8 3.29** 0.57 6 . 6 8
3 0.34 2.47* 0.43 7.02
4 0.29 1.41 0.39 7.31
5 -0 . 0 2 -0 . 2 1 0.30 7.28
6 -0.05 -0.70 0.32 7.23
7 -0.09 -0.60 0.34 7.15
8 0 . 1 2 1.48 0.36 7.27
9 0.05 0.99 0.34 7.32
1 0 -0 . 0 2 -0.50 0.34 7.29
15 -0.03 -0.59 0.32 7.37
2 0 0.13 1.33 0.34 7.54
significant at a.= 0 .0 5  level
significant at a = 0 .0 1  level.
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T ab le 25
Five minute interval abnormal returns, proportion o f  positive returns, and cumulative
abnormal returns o f  42 N Y SE /A M E X  firms w hose initial coverage appeared on the









- 2 0 0.23 1.19 0.48 0.23
-15 0.23 1 . 1 0 0.39 0.77
- 1 0 -0 . 1 1 -1.37 0.32 0.84
-9 0.23 0.97 0.41 1.07
-8 0.13 0.89 0.36 1 . 2 0
-7 0.30 1.95 0.55 1.50
- 6 0.04 0.65 0.43 1.54
-5 0.34 0.94 0.43 1.89
-4 0.08 0.61 0.45 1.96
-3 -0.03 -0 . 2 1 0.34 1.94
-2 0.18 1.67 0.45 2 . 1 1
-1 0.03 0.30 0.43 2.15
0 -0.06 - 1 . 2 2 0.36 2.08
1 0.03 0.29 0.41 2 . 1 1
2 0.09 1 . 0 0 0.48 2 . 2 0
3 0.16 2 .0 1 * 0.52 2.36
4 -0.03 -0.35 0.45 2.33
5 0 . 1 2 1.65 0.41 2.45
6 0 . 0 1 0.17 0.41 2.46
7 0 . 0 1 0.15 0.41 2.47
8 -0.14 -1.49 0.41 2.32
9 -0.09 -1.39 0.39 2.23
1 0 0.07 0.75 0.36 2.30
15 0.15 1.50 0.43 2.33
2 0 0.06 1 .1 1 0.44 2.42
significant at a  =  0 .0 5  level
significant at a  =  0.01 level.
78
Table 26
Five minute interval abnormal returns, proportion of positive returns, and cumulative 
abnormal returns of 45 NASDAQ firms whose initial coverage appeared on the Broad 






Proportion of Cumulative 
positive returns(%)returns(%)
- 2 0 -0.04 -0.18 0.36 -0.04
-15 0 . 2 1 0 . 6 6 0.33 1.34
- 1 0 -0.03 -0.17 0.36 1.69
-9 0.41 2.08* 0.48 2 . 1 0
- 8 0.13 0.54 0.32 2.23
-7 -0 . 0 1 -0.08 0.39 2 . 2 2
- 6 0 . 2 0 1.25 0.41 2.42
-5 -0.05 -0.32 0.30 2.37
-4 -0 . 1 0 -0.50 0.36 2.27
-3 -0.30 -1.36 0.36 1.97
- 2 0.19 1 . 0 0 0.41 2.16
-1 0 . 0 2 0.25 0.36 2.18
0 -0.18 -1.54 0.32 1.99
1 0 . 1 2 0.91 0.41 2 . 1 2
2 -0 . 0 0 -0.03 0.32 2 . 1 1
3 0.32 1.59 0.45 2.43
4 -0.07 -0.37 0.40 2.35
5 -0.05 -0.23 0.40 2.31
6 -0.06 -0.45 0.34 2.25
7 0 . 1 0 0.40 0.36 2.35
8 -0.65 -1.54 0.30 1.69
9 0.33 0.78 0.39 2 . 0 2
1 0 0.23 1.17 0.47 2.25
15 -0 . 2 0 -1.54 0.32 2 . 1 2
2 0 0 . 2 1 0 . 8 8 0.41 2 . 1 0
significant at a = 0 .0 5  level
significant at a = 0 .0 1  level.
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Table 27
Five minute interval raw volume, abnormal volume of 42 NYSE/AMEX firms whose 
initial coverage appeared on the Broad Tape in 1991. 0 in 5 minute interval refers to the 




volume (1 0 0 s)
Abnormal
volume(lOOs) t-value
- 2 0 29.29 15.07 2.13*
-15 16.64 2.43 1.93
- 1 0 5.26 -8.95 3.02**
-9 1 0 . 1 0 -4.98 1.76
- 8 12.64 -1.69 2.44*
-7 17.60 2.38 2.89**
- 6 17.81 3.59 2.59**
-5 23.81 6.07 2.65**
-4 8.81 -6.15 2.80**
-3 14.98 -4.19 2.15*
- 2 7.74 -13.22 2.49*
-1 3.24 -11.80 1.23
0 268.21 193.81 5.82**
1 66.57 52.35 4.07**
2 128.76 114.55 4  4 7 **
3 122.90 108.69 4.95**
4 120.05 105.83 3.18**
5 93.55 79.33 3.95**
6 84.64 70.43 3.63**
7 48.69 34.47 4.12**
8 57.17 42.95 3.84**
9 36.52 22.31 4.03**
1 0 46.81 32.59 4.06**
15 38.60 24.38 2 . 1 1 *
2 0 28.57 14.35 3.80**
significant at a = 0 .0 5  level
significant at o ;= 0 .0 1  level.
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Table 28
Five minute interval raw volume, abnormal volume of 38 NASDAQ firms whose initial 
coverage appeared on the Broad Tape in 1991. 0 in 5 minute interval refers to the 




volume ( 1 0 0 s)
Abnormal
volume(lOOs) t-value
- 2 0 12.17 -0.85 -0 . 1 2
-15 13.97 1.59 0.27
- 1 0 2 0 . 2 2 7.63 0.64
-9 21.64 9.65 0.83
- 8 15.39 3.40 0.38
-7 27.67 14.94 1.27
- 6 9.86 -2.90 -0.87
-5 19.83 6.55 1.19
-4 64.78 52.79 1 . 1 2
-3 22.44 6.04 0.89
- 2 34.81 17.40 1.31
-1 24.75 2.75 0.30
0 17.88 -18.05 -2.67**
1 153.06 141.07 6.99**
2 229.61 217.62 5.30**
3 117.81 105.82 5.70**
4 149.08 137.09 2.97**
5 152.44 140.46 3.89**
6 145.39 133.40 3.31**
7 94.83 82.84 4.20**
8 74.72 62.73 3.48**
9 43.75 31.76 2 .8 8 **
1 0 77.14 65.15 2.67**
15 44.86 32.87 2.34*
2 0 61.78 49.79 2.16*
significant at a = 0 .0 5  level
significant at a = 0 .0 1  level.
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Table 29
Firm symbol, calendar day, time, ask and bid quotes, and cumulative seconds extracted 
from the ISSM files for a firm which received analysts’ initial coverage in 1991. Event 
day 0 is the day the intial coverage appeared on the Dow Jones News Wire.
FIRM EVENT TIME QUOTE-MID
SYMBOL DAY ( H r : M i n )  ASK B I D  POI NT
BIOX - 1 8 1 6 1 8 . 7 5 1 8 1 8  . 3 7 5
BI OX - 1 1 1 2 7 1 8  . 7 5 1 8 . 2 5 1 8  . 5
BI OX - 1 1 1 5 8 19 1 8  . 2 5 1 8 . 6 2 5
BI OX - 1 1 2 1 0 1 9 1 8  . 5 1 8  . 7 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 0 3 1 9 . 2 5 1 8  . 5 1 8 . 8 7 5
BIOX - 1 1 4 0 4 1 9 . 2 5 1 8 . 7 5 1 9
BIOX - 1 1 4 0 6 1 9 . 5 1 8 . 7 5 1 9 . 1 2 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 0 6 1 9 . 5 1 9 1 9 . 2 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 1 1 1 9 . 7 5 1 9 1 9  . 3 7 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 1 4 1 9 . 7 5 1 9 . 2 5 1 9 . 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 1 5 2 0 1 9 . 2 5 1 9 . 6 2 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 1 5 2 0 1 9 . 5 1 9  . 7 5
BI OX - 1 1 4 3 5 2 0 . 2 5 1 9 . 5 1 9 . 8 7 5
BI OX - 1 1 5 1 0 2 0 1 9 . 5 1 9  . 7 5
BI OX - 1 1 5 3 7 2 0 . 2 5 1 9  . 5 1 9  . 8 7 5
BI OX 0 8 1 6 2 0 . 2 5 1 9  . 5 1 9 . 8 7 5
BI OX 0 8 5 6 2 0 . 2 5 1 9 . 7 5 2 0
BI OX 0 9 0 3 2 0 . 2 5 2 0 2 0 . 1 2 5
BI OX 0 9 1 3 2 0 . 7 5 2 0 2 0 . 3 7 5
BI OX 0 9 1 3 2 0 . 7 5 2 0 . 5 2 0 . 6 2 5
BI OX 0 9 1 3 2 1 2 0 . 5 2 0 . 7 5
BI OX 0 9 1 3 2 1 2 0 . 7 5 2 0 . 8 7 5
BI OX 0 9 1 4 2 1 . 2 5 2 0 . 7 5 2 1
BI OX 0 9 1 5 2 1 . 2 5 2 1 2 1 . 1 2 5
BI OX 0 9 1 6 2 1 . 5 2 1 . 2 5 2 1 . 3 7 5
BI OX 0 9 1 8 2 1 . 7 5 2 1 . 5 2 1 . 6 2 5
BI OX 0 9 2 4 2 2 2 1 . 5 2 1 . 7 5
BI OX 0 9 2 4 2 2 2 1 .  7 5 2 1 . 8 7 5
BIOX 0 9 2 7 2 2 . 2 5 2 1 . 7 5 2 2
BI OX 0 9 2 8 2 2  . 5 2 1 . 7 5 2 2 . 1 2 5
BI OX 0 9 2 9 2 2  . 5 2 2 2 2 . 2 5
BIOX 0 9 4 4 2 2  . 5 2 1 . 7 5 2 2 . 1 2 5
BI OX 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 . 2 5 2 1 . 5 2 1 . 8 7 5
BI OX 0 1 0 0 3 2 2 2 1 . 5 2 1 . 7 5
BI OX 0 1 0 0 4 2 1 . 7 5 2 1 2 1 . 3 7 5
BIOX 0 1 0 0 4 2 1 . 5 2 1 2 1 . 2 5
BIOX 0 1 0 0 5 2 1 . 5 2 0 . 7 5 2 1 . 1 2 5
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Table 30
Frequency o f  quote revisions at 5 minute interval in the N Y SE /A M E X  on the release day
(via the D ow  Jones N ew s W ire) o f  analysts’ initial coverages in 1991.
Three information periods are categorized; Pre-information period (days -50,-3), private- 
information period (day 0), and post-information periods (days + 3 ,+  10). Time interval 
0 refers to the first quote on the announcement day. Statistical tests are performed 










0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
1 2.08 3.61 +  + 2.28
2 2.13 3.78+  + 2 .49+  +
3 2.06 3.83 +  + 2 . 2 0
4 2 . 0 1 3.00+ 2 . 1 2
5 2 . 0 0 3.75+  + 2 . 2 1
6 2 . 0 0 3.36+ 2 . 0 1
7 1.87 3.03 + 2 . 1 0
8 1.85 2.87 + 2 . 0 0
9 1.81 2.36 1.96
1 0 1.82 2.45 2.16
1 1 1 . 8 8 2.71 2.17
1 2 1.82 2.53 + 1.97
13 1.85 3.52+  + 2.07
14 1.77 2.60 + 1.90
15 1.72 2.30 2 .27+  +
16 1.80 2.54 2 . 2 0
17 1.76 2.31 2.14 +
18 1.72 2.18 1.85
19 1.75 1.96 2.04 +
2 0 1.83 1.92 1.82
+  , + +  positively significant at a = 0 .0 5 ,  and a = 0 .0 1  level, respectively
-, -- negatively significant at a = 0 .0 5 ,  and a = 0 .0 1  level, respectively
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Table 31
Frequency o f  quote revisions at 5 minute interval in the N A SD A Q  on the release day (via
the D ow  Jones N ew s W ire) o f  analysts’ initial coverages in 1991.
Three information periods are categorized; Pre-information period (days -50,-3), private- 
information period (day 0), and post-information periods (days + 3 ,+  10). Time interval 
0 refers to before 9:30 a.m. on the announcement day. Statistical tests are performed 










0 2 . 8 6 6.79 +  + 2 . 6 6
1 2.03 5.18 +  + 2.28
2 1.96 3.41 +  + 1.65
3 1.76 2 . 0 0 1 . 8 6
4 1 . 6 8 3.13 + 1.73
5 1.90 2.15 1.97
6 1.67 2.27 1.87
7 1.76 3.90 1.82
8 1.84 2.71 1.99
9 1.50 2 . 0 0 1.74
1 0 1.71 2 . 0 0 1.57
11 1.49 2.67 2.24
1 2 1 . 6 6 1.55 2.13
13 1.53 1.50 1 . 8 8
14 1.83 2 . 2 0 1.40
15 1.54 1.83 2 . 1 1
16 1.63 1.33 1.82
17 1 . 6 6 1 . 2 0 2 . 0 0
18 1.48 1.50 1.33
19 1.49 1.29 +  + 1.28—
2 0 1.46 1.83 1.49
+  , + +  positively significant at a = 0 .0 5 , and a = 0 .0 1  level, respectively
-, -- negatively significant at a = 0 .0 5 ,  and a = 0 .0 1  level, respectively
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Table 32
Trading volum e at 5 minute interval in the N Y SE /A M E X  on the release day (via the
D ow  Jones N ew s W ire) o f  analysts’ initial coverages in 1991.
Three information periods are categorized; Pre-information period (days -50,-3), private- 
information period (day 0), and post-information periods (days + 3 ,+  10). Time interval 
0 refers to the first quote on the announcement day. Statistical tests are performed 










0 64.37 259.70+ + 57.44
1 55.36 92.76+  + 40.50
2 69.55 154.50+ + 41.50
3 79.52 139.50+ 59.84
4 59.69 144.10 59.11
5 55.06 122.80 + 50.50
6 53.03 122.60 + 53.35
7 50.52 70.52 45.35
8 55.58 75.03 52.20
9 44.10 59.00 47.19
1 0 41.41 63.42 42.17
11 44.92 41.13 52.01
1 2 39.60 68.94 + 41.15
13 49.63 53.68 38.71
14 44.04 29.70 48.76
15 45.95 67.54 47.91
16 36.79 67.97 63.10
17 38.89 36.65 47.03
18 36.81 34.96 59.79
19 36.95 75.03 49.12
2 0 42.25 42.86 39.87
+  , + +  positively significant at a = 0 .0 5 , and a = 0 .0 1  level, respectively
-, — negatively significant at a = 0 .0 5 , and a = 0 .0 1  level, respectively
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T able 33
Trading volum e at 5 minute interval in the N A SD A Q  on the release day (via the D ow
Jones N ew s W ire) o f  analysts’ initial coverages in 1991.
Three information periods are categorized; Pre-information period (days -50,-3), private- 
information period (day 0), and post-information periods (days + 3 ,+  10). Time interval 
0 refers to before 9:30 a.m. on the announcement day. Statistical tests are performed 










0 11.47 6 .0 8 - 8.57
1 80.86 166.20+ + 44.70-
2 88.18 229.60+ + 52.85
3 81.88 121.20 4 2 .5 8 -
4 66.37 162.60 4 1 .5 5 -
5 76.05 189.20+ 37.39-
6 64.10 193.90+ 47.57
7 61.33 113.80 2 9 .0 6 -
8 61.41 89.67 36.82-
9 60.15 58.33 38.56
10 54.91 95.76 3 2 .6 9 -
11 57.14 67.28 48.03
12 77.21 100.20 55.99
13 48.41 69.46 78.30
14 46.66 65.75 77.25
15 61.96 80.75 39.43
16 49.36 57.71 51.74
17 54.00 131.70 47.80
18 42.65 68.81 82.44
19 37.30 57.90 44.40
20 48.42 88.96 37.59
+  , + +  positively significant at a = 0 .0 5 ,  and ce=0.01 level, respectively











/  P riva te in fo rm a tion
Dre-in fo rm ation
:-in form ation
5 m in u te  interval ( 0 = b e f o r e  9 :30 A.M.)




7  y  P rivate in fo rm ation  '\ y
7 P re -in fo rm a tion  
P ost-in fo rm a tion
5 m inu te  interval ( 0 = b e f o r e  9:30  A.M.) 




■n 1 0 0
P riva te in fo rm a tion  
P re -in fo rm a tion  
P ost-in fo rm a tion
0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0
5 m in u te  interval (0=firs t  t rade)
Figure 8: Trading volum e for firms in the NY SE/AM EX
OO
oo
£>Jr P rivate in fo rm ation  
'  P re -in fo rm a tion  
P ost-in fo rm ation
5 m in u te  interval (0=firs t  t rade)




to 400 shares, medium size if  a trade is from 500 to 9,900 shares, and large size if a 
trade is 1 0 , 0 0 0  shares or more.
As discussed earlier, analysts’ recommendations tend to be privately sent to clients 
in the early morning. Hence, I define the private information period as from market 
opening to the time that analysts’ recommendations are released to the public. I also 
define the pre-information period from days -50 to -3, and the post-information period 
from days 3 to 10. To be comparable to the private information period, I include in 
analysis only trades within the period from opening to the release time in both the pre- 
and post-information periods. For example, if an analyst’s recommendation on a firm 
is released to the public at 2 : 0 0  p .m ., for this firm, only trades occurring in the period 
from opening to 2:00 p.m. each day are included in the analysis. This selection takes 
intraday trading patterns into consideration.
Table 34 reports the proportion of trades in each trade size category. For the 
NYSE/AMEX sample, the proportion of medium size trades significantly increases from 
49% in the pre-information period to 64% of all trades in the private information period, 
while the proportions of small and large trades are significantly decreased. Similar 
results are presented in Panel B for the NASDAQ/OTC sample. The evidence thus 
supports Barclay and W arner’s stealth trading hypothesis in that informed traders prefer 
to use medium size trades when they have private information.
The medium size trades range from 500 shares to 9,900 shares. In fact, we can 
further narrow down the informed traders’ preference of trade size to 1,000 to 4,900
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shares, since the increase in the proportion of trades in the private information period is, 
most apparently, in this trade size range.
Table 35 shows the proportion of trading volume in each trade size category. The 
results based on trading volume are also consistent with Barclay and W arner’s 
hypothesis.
4.5 Sum m ary and  Conclusion
In this essay I have examined several issues related to informed trading. The 
main results are summarized as follows. First, the market is quite efficient in the strong- 
form sense. On average, it takes about five minutes for NYSE/AMEX stocks and about 
ten minutes for NASDAQ/OTC stocks to reflect most of private information contained 
in the analysts’ recommendations. These results are consistent with Holden and 
Subrahmanyam’s (1992) prediction that competition between informed traders tend to 
cause private information to be rapidly incorporated into stock prices.
Second, on the NYSE/AMEX the opening trade is conducted in the call market, 
while on the NASDAQ/OTC market the opening trade is conducted in the dealership 
market. Based on the magnitude of abnormal returns after the opening trade, the call 
market appears to be more efficient than the dealership market in dealing with private 
information. The evidence is consistent with Madhavan’s (1992) model in that when 
information asymmetry is high, the call market is more efficient. However, the 
disadvantage of the call market is that it takes time for the specialist to clear the market, 
while the dealership market is ready for trades when the market opens.
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Third, there is a substantial increase in proportion of medium size trades in the 
private information period, starting from the opening trade to the release of analysts’ 
recommendations to the public. The evidence is consistent with Barclay and W arner’s 
stealth trading hypothesis in that informed traders tends to concentrate their trades in 
medium size, ranging from 500 to 9,900 shares. In the private information period, the 
most significant increase is for trades in size from 1,000 to 4,900 shares, suggesting that 
this is the size the informed traders prefer to use when they have private information.
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Table 34
Time-series behavior of proportion of daily trade frequency for individual securities, by size of 
trade. Sample: 42 NYSE/AMEX and 38 NASDAQ firms with initial coverage in 1991. Daily 
data are estimated from the first trade until the coverages appeared on the Dow Jones News Wire
Proportion o f  Trade Freuuencv








(t =  3,10)
SMALL
100 13.79 2 0 .18+  + 15.58 H—b
200 11.77 13.52 12.06
300 41.03 8.59 45.03 + 5 .6 4 - 42.37 + 8.03
400 6.86 5.69 6.70
M EDIUM
500 10.36 10.04 11.10
600- 900 9.06 9.57 8.00
1,000-1,900 14.99 17.02 16.07
1,900-4,900 43.30 11.87 52.01 +  + 9.53 5 1 .1 3 +  + 11.73
5,000-9,900 7.08 5.87 6.37
LARGE
OVER 10,000 5.70 2 .9 7 - 4 .3 5 -
Panel B: NASDAQ
SMALL
100 12.70 9 .0 6 - 13.76
200 9.52 9.53 10.48
300 34.55 7.12 2 5 .9 5 - 5 .1 6 - 35.77 + 6.86
400 5.14 2 .2 0 - 4.67
MEDIUM
500 8.63 8.66 8.84
600-900 5.92 3.61— 5.32
1,000-1,900 22.01 34.41 +  + 23.56
1,900-4,900 57.02 12.04 6 8 .50+  + 13.50 57.41 12.21
5,000-9,900 8.40 8.12 7.48
LARGE
OVER 10,000 8.42 5 .5 4 - 6.82-
+ +  and +  (— and -) indicate that proportion o f trade frequency is significantly larger (smaller) than that 
in the pre-information period at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively. The numbers in bold character refer 
to the average total proportion o f trade frequency in each size category.
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Table 35
Time-series behavior of proportion of daily trade volume for individual securities, by size of 
trade. Sample: 42 NYSE/AMEX and 38 NASDAQ firms with initial coverage in 1991. Daily 
data are estimated from the first trade until the coverages appeared on the Dow Jones News Wire
Proportion o f Trade Volume
Panel A: NYSE/AM EX
Pre-inform. Private-inform. Post-inform.
period period period
Size (days -50,-3) (day= 0) (t =  3,10)
SMALL
100 0.77 3.12 + 1.17 +
200 1.29 3.64 + 1.76 +
300 4.96 1.41 13.66 + 1.83 6.54 + 1.82
400 1.49 5.07 1.79
MEDIUM
500 2.76 5.16 4.20
600-900 3.42 7.63 3.77
1,000-1,900 9.24 16.00 + 13.90-
1,900-4,900 50.83 16.36 63 .76+  + 16.22 61 .69+  + 18.95
5,000-9,900 19.05 18.77 20.87
LARGE
OVER 10,000 44.20 2 2 .5 5 - 3 1 .7 8 -
Panel B: NASDAQ
SMALL
100 0.63 0.70 0.78
200 0.90 1.43+  + 1.18 +
300 3.45 0.97 3 .9 4 + 1.14 4.07 + 1.09
400 0.95 0.67 1.01
M EDIUM
500 2.01 2 .9 0 + + 2.41 +
600-900 1.96 1.92 1.98
1,000-1,900 10.70 2 1 .16+  + 13.56+ +
1,900-4,900 46.79 13.39 66 .79+  + 1 9 .3 4 + +  53.17 + 15.61
5,000-9,900 18.73 21.47 19.61
LARGE
OVER 10,000 49.76 2 9 .2 9 - 42.76-
+  +  and +  (— and -) indicate that proportion o f trade frequency is significantly larger (smaller) than that 
in the pre-information period at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The numbers in bold character refer 
to the average total proportion o f frequency in each size category.
P riva te in fo rm a tion  
P re -in fo rm a tion  








V /  Private in fo rm ation  
/  P re-in form ation  
P ost-in fo rm ation
10-
LARGEM EDIUMS M A LL
T r a d e  Size










CD 3 0  
CL
20 -
■-* /  Private in fo rm ation  
/  P re -in fo rm a tion  
P ost-in fo rm ation
10 - '
M EDIUMS M ALL
T r a d e  Size









' / /  Private in fo rm a tion  
P re -in fo rm a tion  
P ost-in fo rm ation
M EDIUM  
T r a d e  Size
LARGE




This dissertation has explored the information content and market microstructure 
effects of analysts’ initial coverages. Its contributions can be summarized as follows. 
First, I find that a large abnormal return is associated with the release of analysts’ initial 
coverages. The abnormal return is much larger than the abnormal returns found in 
previous studies on analysts’ buy recommendations. The evidence implies that analysts’ 
initial coverages have substantial marginal information content and that it is greater than 
the marginal information content of buy recommendations on firms already in the 
analysts’ lists.
Second, I find that firm size is an important determinant of the abnormal return 
on the release day of analysts’ recommendations. The results are consistent with Stickel 
(1985), Atiase (1985), and Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992), which show that 
marginal information contents of public announcements are larger for small firms than 
for large firms.
Third, I find that there is a positive relation between the information content of 
analysts’ initial coverages and normal trading volume. The result is in support of 
Bhushan’s (1989) argument that the price system of firms with high volume carries more 
noise. Hence, the marginal information content of analysts’ recommendations is greater 
for firms with higher volume.
Fourth, with the use o f intraday transaction and quote data, I find that the U.S.
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stock markets are quite efficient in the strong form. On average, it takes about five 
minutes for NYSE/AMEX stocks and about ten minutes for NASDAQ stocks to reflect 
most of private information contained in the analysts’ recommendations. The evidence 
is consistent with Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) who posit that private information 
will be quickly incorporated into stock prices when there is competition between 
informed traders.
Fifth, by examining abnormal returns at the first trade and subsequent trades, I 
find that private information can be more efficiently revealed in the call market than in 
the dealership market. However, in the call market, on average, it takes about ten 
minutes from opening at 9:30 a.m. for the specialist to clear the market. On the other 
hand, the dealership market is ready for trades when the market opens. The evidence 
thus suggests a tradeoff between the efficiency of a market and the time to complete a 
trade in that market.
Sixth, there is a substantial increase in proportion of trades in medium size, 
ranging from 500 to 9,900 shares, in the private information period, starting from the 
opening trade to the release of analysts’ recommendations to the public. The evidence 
is consistent with Barclay and W arner’s stealth trading hypothesis that informed traders 
tend to concentrate their trades in medium size.
The overall evidence in this study suggests that although analysts’ initial buy 
recommendations have a significant valuation effect, the profitability of following 
analysts’ recommendations may be not be large. For one thing, most of the abnormal 
returns occur at the opening trade. This suggests that the price (informed) traders pay
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to buy shares at the opening already reflects most of the private information. 
Furthermore, the rest of the private information is quickly impounded into stock prices. 
If transaction costs, including brokers’ commissions, dealers’ bid-ask spreads, and time 
and efforts of receiving and implementing analysts’ recommendations, are taken into 
account, the net profit is likely to be small. Therefore, the valuation effect of analysts’ 
recommendations and its economic value for informed traders should be interpreted with 
caution.
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Appendix
A sample of document, which is extracted from the TEXT of Dow Jones News Services for a 
firm with initial coverage in 1991.
DOCUMENT= 29
AN 190524-1755.
HL * Dean Witter Issues Initial Buy Rating On Coventry; Stk Up 
DD 05/24/91
SO * DOW JONES NEWS WIRE (DJ)
CO CVTY
LP By Phillip E. Nalbone
Dow Jones Staff Reporter 
TX NEW YORK -DJ- Peter Small, senior vice president of marketing and public
relations at Coventry Corp., says the company’s stock apparently is higher in response to a 
report * today by Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. analyst Todd Richter.
” If the stock is up, it’s probably due to the issuance of a favorable report by Mr. Richter,” 
Small says, adding he hasn’t seen a copy of the report. Small says there haven’t been any recent 
corporate developments that might have triggered today’s activity in the stock. Dean Witter was 
the managing underwriter of Coventry’s
* April 17 initial public offering of 3 million common shares at a price of $ 14.50 a share. Small 
says the other lead underwriters of the offering - Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Securities and 
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. - haven’t yet published reports on Coventry. Coventry, 
based in Nashville, Tenn., is a managed health care company with health-maintenance 
organizations in Pittsburgh and Harrisburg, Pa., and St. Louis. Coventry also operates an 
individual health benefits company, Fort Worth, Texas-based American Service Cos., which 
provides insurance coverage to individuals and small businesses in 42 states. Today, the stock 
is up 1 3/4, or 10.8 pc, at 18 1/2 on 121,700 shares, Compared with average daily volume of 
about 229,000. Today’s high of 18 1/2 is the stock’s highest level
* since the initial offering and represents a 28 pc gain over the offering price. Dean Witter’s 
Richter tells Dow Jones Professional
* Investor Report that he initiated coverage of Coventry today with a ’’buy” recommendation. 
He notes that the health management group has been strong the past several trading sessions, 
but that Coventry’s shares haven’t participated in the group’s upward move. At yesterday’s 
closing price of 16 1/4, Richter says, the stock was trading at a multiple of less than 10 times 
estimated 1992 earnings of $1.65 a share. That multiple, he says, represented ’’way too wide 
a gap” from the other stocks in the group, which have tended to trade recently in a multiple 
range of 13 to 15 times estimated 1992 earnings. * For 1991, the Dean Witter analyst is 
estimating earnings of $1.40 a share, compared with 1990 earnings of $1.18.
12:25 PM 
10607 * END OF DOCUMENT.
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